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Contracting out public schools to private institutions is an instrument for
reforming public education as it may facilitate academic innovation and im-
prove student academic performance through higher school accountability and
autonomy. The degree of autonomy that different providers have may vary sub-
stantially depending on the contractual and institutional arrangements they are
subject to. In principle, contractual differences should generate different sets
of incentives for providers that may ultimately affect student academic perfor-
mance. One can expect, for example, that programs with limited achievement
accountability rules might invest sub-optimally in resources aiming at improv-
ing the academic performance of their students.
In this dissertation, I evaluate short- and longer-run achievement effects
of the Colegios en Concesión (CEC) program, a large-scale initiative implemented
in 2000 in Bogota, Colombia, which contracted out the administration of some
traditional public schools (TPS) to reputed, not-for-profit private schools and
universities. This program allows participating schools to operate outside public
schools’ collective bargaining provisions in return for being accountable, among
other things, for the academic performance of their students in the ICFES test, a
high-stakes college entry national standardized test.
The major empirical challenge in studies of alternative school models is
selection bias. Students who attend CEC schools may differ in a number of
ways from public school students. To overcome potential selection bias of CEC
attendance, I exploit variation in distance from a student’s residence to the clos-
est CEC institution as an instrument for CEC attendance. While distance may
in theory be correlated with unobservable characteristics of students, I demon-
strate using a variety of empirical strategies that this instrument is conditionally
exogenous of unobserved determinants of academic achievement.
I first evaluate the effects of attending a CEC school on ICFES test scores.
Instrumental variables results indicate that CEC students exhibit important and
significant gains in test scores on the ICFES test. That is, the two-stage least
squares estimates obtained indicate that CEC students score 0.6 and 0.2 standard
deviations higher in math and verbal tests, respectively, relative to TPS students.
I provide evidence that the positive test score results of CEC attendance are not
driven by unintended strategic responses by CEC schools such as excluding low-
performing students from the pool of test-takers or via test specialization in the
curriculum, or by significant differences in education inputs such as teachers’
education, student-teacher ratios, or expenditures per student. I also provide
suggestive auxiliary evidence that the estimated results are a consequence of an
institutional arrangement that makes CEC schools accountable for the academic
performance of their students.
I also evaluate whether attending a CEC school translates into longer-run
gains in potentially more meaningful outcomes such as increasing the probabil-
ity of investing in post-secondary schooling, attending a more selective tertiary
institution, or being admitted in high-return academic programs. The results
on college attendance indicate that CEC students exhibit a significantly higher
probability of attending a higher education institution and to attend a vocational
program relative to TPS students. Moreover, CEC students have a slightly higher
probability of attending a selective public institution and are not more likely to
drop out from college relative to TPS students.
The overall results provide compelling evidence that the contractual ar-
rangement that defines the operation of CEC schools are successful at improving
the academic performance of their students relative to TPS.
CONTRACTING OUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
by
Juan D. Bonilla-Angel
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Judith K. Hellerstein, Chair
Professor Melissa Kearney
Professor Robert M. Schwab
Professor Raymond Guiteras





Siempre me ha gustado la idea de elogiar a la dificultad con la vida misma. (Así
también me enamoré de ti. Luchando en la corriente de un amor temeroso que se perdía
entre palabras ausentes). No fueron pocas las veces del discurso de motivación ante las
dificultades de estos años de estudio. Tan presentes. Tan copiosas. Estamos aquí a pesar
de haber desconfiado tanto. De esa terrible manía de atribuirle lo propio a la suerte y
lo impropio a sí mismos. Pero hoy no. Hoy quiero celebrar que hallamos tomado una
de las mejores decisiones de nuestras vidas. Pese a los costos. Enormes. Pese a las
lágrimas y a algunos momentos para el olvido. Pero juntos. Juntos, porque solo ni a
palo. Aprendiendo a cocinar. A conocernos en otra lengua y a hacer amigos de mundos
ajenos. A disfrutar de todo ese tiempo juntos que siempre se queda corto. Porque siempre
me quedan faltando minutos para estar contigo. Pidiéndole tiempo al juez al final del
encuentro diario. A ti, mi Carito, te dedico esta disertación.
ii
Acknowledgments
I am specially indebted to my advisor, Judy Hellerstein, for giving me sup-
port and encouragement that I had only received before by members of my own
family. For contributing to my education as an economist and for generously
sharing her time and knowledge in that sweetest way of hers. For reading my
mind in those days I was lost in translation, respecting the long silences and
disappearances, and for looking after me in so many ways. I just hope that one
day I can be half the advisor she was to me and indirectly pay for all I have
received from her during these years.
I am grateful to Raymond Guiteras, Melissa Kearney, and Bob Schwab for
their invaluable contributions to this dissertation, for kindly questioning me on
unresolved issues and for enthusiastically supporting me when I needed. I am
also indebted to Abby Alpert, Mark Duggan, Teresa Fort, Carolina González,
and Gabriel Lara for invaluable conversations and contributions to improve the
contents of this dissertation and to Steven J. Klees for agreeing to participate in
the dissertation committee. Finally, this dissertation would have never been pos-
sible without the support and generosity of Maria Camila Uribe, Fabio Sánchez,
and, most specially, Julián Mariño. I have the greatest admiration for the work
they do. For making things happen in a country so much in need of people of
their qualities.
Understandably, some may use these lines to publicly acknowledge those
who, in one way or another, made one’s dissertation possible. For a public recog-
nition is just morally due in these circumstances. But I may do something else
as well. For I would like to use this space too to celebrate the little occurrences
of the common life in the company of those with whom we spent most days
and nights and sometimes made this dissertation happily impossible. To Abby
Alpert, Paul Bailey, Teresa Fort, and Aaron Szott; Sergio Díaz and Álvaro La
Parra —los vecinos—; and Daniel Hernaiz, Gabriel Lara, and César Sosa-Padilla
—los chicos del Chateau—. I am thankful for having shared with them "all those
frivolous nothings which fill up the void of human life" and hope, with Carolina,
to remain a part of their lives despite the distance.
To my parents, I owe a powerful idea. A beautiful idea that was never
explicitly taught, yet too present to be overlooked: that there is nothing more
satisfactory in life than helping others —within our own limitations. Perhaps I
should not be surprised by how much this has defined my professional journey
and I hope it will keep defining my research agenda. Finally, I want to thank my
mother and my sister Cristina for believing so much in me and letting me know
it. For their unconditional support that always keeps me hopeful that everything
—no matter what— is going to be alright.
iii
CONTENTS
1. The Effects of Contracting Out Public Schools: The Case of Colombia’s CEC
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Colegios en Concesión (CEC) Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 CEC School Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Short-Run Effects of CEC attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Longer-Run Effects of CEC attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Short-run Effects of the CEC Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.1 Public Education Sector in Bogotá . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.1 Structural Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.2 Estimating the Causal Effect of CEC School Attendance . . 37
2.4.3 Using Distance to the Closest CEC School as an Instrument 39
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.1 First Stage Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.2 2SLS Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6.1 A Placebo Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6.2 Characterizing Treatment Effect Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . 54
2.7 Mechanisms for Higher Academic Achievement . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7.1 Strategic Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.7.2 Alternative Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.7.3 A Contract for Academic Achievement . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix A. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix B. Full Set of Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix C. Calculating Relative Distance to Closest CEC School . . . . . . . . . 79
3. Longer-Run Effects of the CEC Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2.1 Higher Education in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5.1 First Stage Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.5.2 2SLS Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Appendix D. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
v
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Evaluation Methodology since 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1 Sample Exclusion Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 Descriptive Statistics by School Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3 Exogeneity of Relative Distance to Closest CEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 First Stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 OLS and 2SLS Results of CEC Attendance on ICFES Scores . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Placebo Test: Reduced Form Effects of Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.7 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.8 School Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.9 First Stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.10 Full Set of 2SLS Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.11 Matched and Unmatched Samples by School Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.1 Selected Descriptive Statistics by College Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Higher Education Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 First Stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4 OLS, Reduced Form, and 2SLS Estimates of CEC attendance . . . . . . . 112
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Location of TPS, New TPS, and CEC Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2 CEC’s ICFES Performance Relative to TPS in same Locality . . . . . . . 25
1.3 CEC Academic Performance Component 2007-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 CEC Non-Academic Indicators 2007-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 CEC Overall Evaluation 2007-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1 Location of CEC Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Distribution of Relative Distance to Closest CEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Dropout and Transfer Rates by School Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4 UPZs with CEC Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5 Non-linearity of RD on CEC Attendance Probability . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6 Proportion of Students by Intervals of Actual Distance . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.7 Location of Public and CEC Students’ Residence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.8 Commuting Patterns of 5 CEC Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.9 Distribution of Relative Distance in 2000 and 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 ICFES Composite Score Distribution by School Types . . . . . . . . . . 113
vii
1. THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTING OUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
THE CASE OF COLOMBIA’S CEC PROGRAM
1.1. Introduction
The question of whether private schools provide better education than
public schools has been a long and much debated issue. This question is, for
example, at the center of the debate over the effects on academic performance
of vouchers, charter schools, and other programs that allow the participation of
the private sector in the provision of public education.
In order to improve the quality of public education, policy makers and
researchers have examined the way in which public education is provided. Pro-
ponents of public-private partnerships in education argue that the political insti-
tutions that govern public schools inhibit the existence of academically effective
organizations, as services are provided by organized labor unions that tend to
put too much weight on the welfare of their members in detriment of education
quality (Chubb and Moe, [1990]). Opponents, on the other hand, assert that
due to contractual incompleteness, contractors engage in cost-saving strategies
that affect those aspects of quality which are essentially non-contractible and
tend to avoid problem (i.e. unprofitable) students that the public authorities are
responsible for serving. It has also been argued that private schools may have
curriculums that do not fully reflect the social goals of education such as serving
as an agent of socialization into a common set of moral values (Benveniste, et.
al, [2003]).
While the movement towards choice and decentralization in public educa-
tion has included programs as varied as vouchers, magnet/pilot schools, and
intra-district plans, contracted-out public schools appear to be one of the most
replicated strategies among the reform initiatives.1 Unlike voucher programs
—where the control over the quality of education provided by participating
schools is mostly left to private users— contracting out public schools is an
attractive choice to policy makers as it allows the state to retain a fair measure
of control over service delivery by monitoring performance, imposing penalties
or by replacing providers in case of performance failure. To some extent, char-
ter schools in the Unites States and in Alberta (Canada), Academies in England,
Free schools in Sweden, and CEC schools in Bogota (Colombia) are salient exam-
ples of this type of education provision. That is, initiatives aiming at broadening
the decision-making autonomy of schools and promoting accountability, while
remaining under —admittedly varying levels of— public control.
In the literature on public-private partnerships in education, both charter
schools in the US and voucher programs in Latin America have received spe-
1 Charter schools in the US are a prominent example of this type of strategies with more
than 5500 institutions by 2010 up from 1,200 schools in 1999 —a five-fold increase (Center for
Education Reform, www.edreform.com last visited on May 15, 2011).
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cial attention. Charter schools in the United States are privately run schools,
partially funded by the state and attended by choice. With greater flexibility,
charter schools are able to run longer school days, have an academic curriculum
different from public schools, and finance their activities through a mix of public
and private funds. Also, they are able to operate outside teachers’ collective bar-
gaining provisions that constrain seniority and tenure conditions in traditional
public schools (for a description of US charter school experiences see, for ex-
ample, Hoxby [2009], Matthews [2009], and Wilson [2008]). Nevertheless, as I
explain in more detail below, the evidence on charter schools in the US is rather
mixed with positive effects being found for some schools and some grades only.
The evidence on voucher programs in Latin America is not conclusive ei-
ther. Using panel data for a large voucher program in Chile, Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006) find no positive effects on mean test scores, repetition rates, or years of
schooling. They find, however, evidence of increased sorting, as the best pub-
lic school students moved to private schools. A second voucher program that
has received attention in the literature is the lottery-allocated PACES program
during the 1990s in Colombia (King, [1997]; Angrist et al, [2002]; Angrist et al,
[2006]; Bettinger et al [2010]), one of the largest voucher school programs to have
ever been implemented. The short- and long-run goals of this program were to
rapidly raise secondary-school enrollment rates through private academic in-
stitutions and to improve the education quality through school competition for
voucher recipients (Kling et al [1998]). Angrist et al (2002) found that lotteried-in
students were more likely to finish 8th grade —mainly because they were less
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likely to repeat grades— and to score higher on achievement tests.2 Moreover,
Angrist et al (2006) find that voucher winners were 15 to 20 percent more likely
to graduate from high school than lotteried-out participants. Interestingly, these
results seem to have been driven by students who switched to more expensive
private schools but who would have attended private schools had they not re-
ceived a school voucher. In fact, 85% of lottery losers started secondary school in
a private institution. What these results indicate is that lottery participants did
not come from low-income families, perhaps the group of first-order importance
for this type of programs.
The inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of the private provision of
public education has been used by some authors to question all forms of public-
private partnerships in education such as charter school programs (Benveniste,
et. al, [2003]; Levin, [2003]; Ravitch, [2010]). However, perhaps what the mixed
evidence on these public-private partnerships in education suggests is that the
debate on education provision should not be so much about privately versus
publicly run schools but about designing the right incentives in order to induce
public schools to be responsible for the academic performance of their students
—for example, by creating school accountability policies for both school admin-
istrators and teachers.
In this dissertation, I study the short- and longer-run causal effects of the
Colegios en Concesión (henceforth, CEC) Program, an initiative implemented in
Bogota (Colombia) in the year 2000 that aimed at improving the quality of ed-
2 The effect on test scores is significant at a 10% confidence level.
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ucation imparted by public schools by contracting out some public schools to
private operators while retaining a fair amount of control over the services pro-
vided.
1.2. The Colegios en Concesión (CEC) Program
The ability of the Department of Education of Bogota (hereafter, SED) to
implement policies that improve academic performance depends, to a great ex-
tent, on its ability to direct and coordinate the actions of the complex public
education sector in Bogotá, which consists of more than 26,000 teachers oper-
ating within a national collective bargaining agreement. The existing institu-
tional arrangement leaves the SED with little room to introduce major changes
aimed at improving quality of education. First, wages are determined through
a bargaining process between the teachers union and the national government
—not the local government— and are determined by education and tenure as
opposed to performance. Second, the SED has little ability to coordinate the
actions of traditional public schools (hereafter, TPS) through school principals,
and principals themselves do not have social or legal instruments to exert au-
thority and demand the fulfillment of assigned tasks to teachers. Indeed, al-
though the SED has the power to appoint and transfer school principals and
teachers, dismissals or other disciplinary sanctions are the responsibility of the
Ranking Board, a committee where teachers’ interests had traditionally been
over-represented (Gandour et. al, [2000]).
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These institutional limitations prompted the creation of the CEC school
program. The argument was that this program would allow the SED to be able
to monitor and demand academic quality in some schools given the lack of high
power incentives to encourage teacher cooperation in TPS. Thus, all the new
public schools constructed by the SED between 1999 and 2003 were contracted
out to private academic institutions. The SED established 15-year contracts with
private schools and universities through a bidding process based on the superior
academic results of their own institutions in the ICFES test, the proposed profile
of potential teachers and yearly cost per-student. A total of 16 schools opened
primary school grades (grades 1 to 5) in April 2000 and then added secondary
education (grades 6 to 11) the year after. Six more schools began operating in
March 2001, providing up to 10th grade that year and graduating their first class
in 2002. The last 3 schools opened in 2003 for all academic grades.
The CEC program is of interest for a number of reasons. First, to the best of
my knowledge, this initiative is one of the largest programs of its kind to have
been implemented by a local administration in a developing country, serving
more than 40,000 students in all academic grades (from pre- to high-school).
Second, the CEC program is a publicly designed program aimed at im-
proving education quality. In fact, this program is the first education policy in
Colombia designed to hold public schools accountable for the academic perfor-
mance of their students. This is unlike similar public-private partnerships like
U.S. charter schools, which have been implemented as a private response to pub-
lic education. The Center for Education Reform, a U.S. charter advocate, states
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that "Virtually anyone can submit an application to open and operate a char-
ter school: parents, educators, museums, civic groups, business leaders, service
organizations and teachers have started schools in United States". As a result,
charter schools in the U.S. are diverse and many are specifically created to be
an alternative for those interested in subjects missing in traditional education:
special arts or music programs, language, adult education, dropout prevention
programs, and special education needs (Hoxby and Rockoff, [2004]). As a result,
some charters may not see academic performance as their primary goal.
An implication of the CEC program as a public policy is that all CEC
schools are very similar along most relevant dimensions. First, the geographic
location of each contracted out school was chosen by the Department of Educa-
tion (SED) according to the demand for public education. As a result, all CEC
schools were located in low-income areas of the city where excess demand for
public education was highest. Second, the SED constructed all of these schools
and made them similar in terms of their physical characteristics. Third, CEC
schools must follow the same academic curriculum of TPS so that, other things
equal, there should be no difference in academic achievement due to differential
academic content. Fourth, CECs do not get to choose their own students but
instead have to take those students allocated by the SED. Fifth, expenditures per
student are practically the same as those of TPS. For the purpose of this study, a
clear methodological advantage of having a relatively homogeneous program is
that it reduces concerns about estimating their joint effect on academic perfor-
mance. Also, the fact that CEC schools are similar to TPS in dimensions such as
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academic curriculum and per-student expenditures allows us to rule out some
of the mechanisms behind academic performance.
On the other hand, CEC schools are different from TPS in some important
ways. First, CEC schools are able to hire teachers at regulated salaries on ten-
month renewable contracts from a non-unionized pool of applicants. That is,
unlike TPS, CEC schools have the flexibility to hire and fire teachers as needed
on a yearly basis. In addition, the contracts establish that teachers should have at
least a college degree in Education and have some years of relevant experience.
Teacher wages are regulated by law so that CEC teachers earn at least what TPS
teachers earn according to education level and experience. Interestingly, given
the differences in job stability for public and CEC teachers, CEC school teachers
often find it optimal to move to TPS, with some CEC schools having turnover
rates of as much as 40% per year. Second, while many TPS provide either pri-
mary or secondary grades, CEC schools provide all academic grades, a strategy
that not only aims to reduce dropouts, but perhaps more importantly a strategy
that provides incentives for long run student investments by the school. Third,
the average CEC school has better school facilities than the average TPS as a re-
sult of being more recently built by the SED. Nevertheless, as many as fifty new
TPS constructed after 2004 and located in similar low-income neighborhoods
(see Figure 1.1) have facilities comparable to CEC schools.3
3 These new schools were not contracted out since the CEC program was phased out in 2004
with the election of a new city mayor.
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1.2.1. CEC School Evaluations
Perhaps the most important difference between CEC and TPS schools is
that the former are subject to performance evaluations by organizations con-
tracted by SED for this purpose. Importantly, only after 2007 a standardized
and more comprehensive annual evaluation was implemented —including ad-
ditional indicators in terms of a national standardized test known as ICFES. The
ICFES test4 is a high-stakes, multiple-subject, Colombian national standardized
test taken by the vast majority of high school students in their last year of high
school and serves as the main criterion to determine admission into higher edu-
cation institutions.
Before 2007, the evaluations conducted did not aim at becoming a regu-
lar instrument for tracking CEC performance partly since these were conducted
by different organizations with different methodological approaches. Starting
in 2007, the current evaluation has used quantitative and qualitative indica-
tors on multiple outcomes related to academic quality such as student academic
achievement, teachers’ education and experience, participation of students, par-
ents and teachers in school bodies, quantity and quality of food provision, and
transfer and dropout rates. As shown in Table 1.1, the current methodology is
divided into components and each component is in turn divided into indicators.
Note that both indicators and components are weighted in order to generate
a composite grade for each CEC school. An important feature of the current
4 The current name of this test is SABER 11
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evaluation method is that it allows for individual school comparisons over time.
Regarding the academic achievement component (with 20% of the weight),
the current evaluation looks at each CEC school average performance on the
ICFES test using a weighted average of their overall and relative performance.
The overall measure —receiving 40% of the weight within the academic perfor-
mance component— ranks all private and public schools in the country accord-
ing to their average performance in the ICFES test in 7 achievement levels. Since
2004, the average CEC school has been placed in the fourth level with very little
variation over time. Whereas the average CEC school in the period 2004-2007
was placed in level 4.44, this figure was 4.59 for the 2008-2010 period. As ref-
erence, the 2008 average CEC ICFES score difference between any two adjacent
levels is 0.2 standard deviations. This may be an indication of how difficult it
may be to move to a higher achievement level. This may be partly explained by
the fact that this indicator does not control for SES differences between schools.
Thus, in order to move to a higher achievement level, schools need to improve
their performance relative to all schools including private schools.
The contracts with CEC providers recognize that overall performance is an
imperfect measure of school quality as academic achievement is highly corre-
lated with students’ background. Indeed, the contracts state that the SED can
unilaterally break the contract whenever a school’s average results in the ICFES
test are worse than the performance of the average TPS in their locality for two
consecutive years.5 Consequently, the current evaluation takes this indicator into
5 Bogota is administratively divided in 20 localities and there are CEC schools in 10 of them.
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account. In Figure 1.2, I show differences in means between each CEC school
and the average TPS in their locality for both 2007 and 2008. For both years,
the horizontal axis is sorted in ascending order of the 2008 CEC-TPS ICFES dif-
ference to facilitate visualization. Note, first, that for 2008, seven CEC schools
have scores statistically higher than the average TPS in their locality. Also, for
the remaining schools, the difference in means is not statistically different from
zero at a 95% confidence level. Moreover, although four CEC schools in 2007
did perform below the average TPS in their locality, they managed to improve
their performance in 2008. What these results suggest is that defining academic
achievement relative to TPS in the same locality as stated in the provision con-
tracts is a condition that not all CEC schools easily achieve.
In Figures 1.3 to 1.5, I present the evolution of the current evaluation for
the period 2007 to 2009. Figure 1.3 shows the results in percentage terms on
the academic achievement component for all CEC schools for these years, where
the horizontal axis represents each one of the CEC schools. As shown, the vast
majority of schools have consistently maintained or improved their academic
performance in these three years. However, that many schools are scoring just
60% in this component suggests there may be some room for improvement in
this area. Moreover, note that the positive trend in time is not only occurring
in the academic component. The results are indeed similar in all components,
including —as shown in Figure 1.4— the one related to having low drop-out
rates or the quality and quantity of the food provided to students. The overall
grade for each CEC school in Figure 1.5 just confirms the pattern. I interpret
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these results as evidence that CEC schools are taking the current evaluation
seriously, partly to comply with contractual demands, but also because they
may be interested in showing merits in case they apply for contract renewal in
the years to come.6
1.2.2. Related Literature
Charter Schools
The CEC program has features in common with some charter school experiences
in the US and therefore serves as a framework to compare the estimated effects
of CEC attendance with those of charter school programs. Both CEC and US
charter programs are supported by public funds, receive students interested in
public education, cannot select their own students, and are not subject to teacher
collective bargaining agreements. However, unlike CEC schools, charter schools
are responsible for finding their own students, may target students interested in
non-standard education programs (e.g., arts, music, language, special education,
etc.), and are partially funded by private donors.7 CEC schools, on the other
hand, are required to take the students allocated by the SED, have the same
academic curriculum TPS have, and are fully funded by public resources.
Most of the recent studies on charter schools use admission lotteries to
circumvent the concerns about non-random selection. There is mixed evidence
in the lottery-based literature of charter school attendance on academic achieve-
6 The first contracts will expire in 2014.
7 For example, the Harlem Children Zone Charter in New York City spends 25% more than
the median per-pupil expenditure in New York State public schools (Dobbie and Fryer [2009]).
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ment, usually with positive effects being found for some grades only. The over-
all evidence indicates that charter school students score from 0.3 to 0.4 standard
deviations higher than lottery losers in math tests per year of treatment and
around 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations higher in reading tests per year (Angrist
et. al [2010]; Abdulkadiroglu et. al, [2009]; Dobbie and Fryer, [2009]; Hoxby and
Murarka, [2009]; Hoxby and Rockoff, [2004]). It is important to keep in mind,
however, that charter schools that are forced to use lotteries to determine admis-
sion may be the most effective charter schools —those that parents find more
appealing and continue to operate. As a result, the reported estimated effects
may not speak of the overall effect of charter school attendance.
In turn, studies that have used panel data to account for unobserved time
invariant student characteristics in the US find that charters students experience
poor test score growth in the first years after enrollment but later recover from
this initial disruption, with no significant gain in test scores from charter school
attendance after some time (Saas, [2004]; Bifulco and Ladd, [2004]; Hanushek
et. al, [2007]; Booker et. al [2007]). There is some evidence, however, of positive
charter effects on school attendance and lower disciplinary sanctions (Imberman,
[2009b]).
Test-Based Accountability
A second group of educational programs that have similarities to the CEC school
program are those that impose sanctions on low-performing public schools.8
8 In the US, for example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) established penalties
for failing to meet performance standards in all states. In particular, the NCLB requires states
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The existing literature has traditionally focused on school responses to increased
accountability, in particular, to what extent higher academic results are driven
by unintended strategic responses by affected schools. An example of a posi-
tive response to increased accountability is Chiang (2009). Using a regression
discontinuity design and data from public schools in Florida, this study finds
that threatened elementary schools raised math and reading test scores in 0.12
and 0.1 standard deviations, respectively, by raising spending on technology,
curricular improvements, and teacher training.
Although schools face a powerful incentive to raise their academic perfor-
mance ratings by reforming the inputs and processes of the educational produc-
tion, most of the existing evidence suggests that schools opt to strategically re-
spond to the accountability system in ways not intended by policy makers. That
is, by raising test scores without contributing to students’ knowledge and skills.
Examples of these responses are to reclassify low-performing students into spe-
cial education, or to impose longer disciplinary sanctions near testing dates so
that these students do not affect school average test results (Deere and Strayer,
[2001]; Figlio and Getzler, [2002]; Cullen and Reback, [2002]; Jacob, [2005]; Figlio,
[2006]). Moreover, there is also evidence that higher test score results have been
driven by increasing test-preparation at the expense of low-stakes subjects such
as the natural sciences (Koretz and Barron, [1998]; Jacob, [2005]), or through
teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt, [2003]). This literature stresses the impor-
to test students in grades 3 to 8 each year and to judge school performance on the basis of these
test scores.
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tance of assessing potential strategic responses by CEC schools when interpret-
ing the estimated effects of CEC attendance on test scores.
CEC School Program
There have been two previous evaluations of the CEC school program in Bo-
gotá. First, Sarmiento et al. (2005) surveyed 22 CEC schools as well as to 10 TPS
with similar characteristics. That study concludes that CEC schools have a better
academic environment, have more autonomy to manage both teachers and re-
sources, and are more exposed to supervision by the SED. Barrera (2005), using
a propensity score matching strategy, finds that CEC schools have lower dropout
rates compared to similar TPS. He also finds evidence that students from CEC
school students score 1 to 2 more points in the ICFES test relative to TPS stu-
dents. Both of these studies are early evaluations of the effects of the program,
which may be problematic given that students graduating from CEC schools in
the first years of the program spent most of their elementary and middle school
years at TPS.
1.3. Short-Run Effects of CEC attendance
In this dissertation, I start by examining the effects of attending a CEC
school on test scores using data for all TPS and CEC students in Bogotá who
took the ICFES test in the second semester of 2008.
The major empirical challenge in studies of alternative school models is
selection bias. Students who attend CEC schools may differ in a number of
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ways from public school students. Some of this bias is eliminated by control-
ling for observable student and family characteristics, but the possibility of bias
remains from unobserved variables that determine school choice such as a stu-
dent’s ability, motivation or some other features of family background. For
example, higher unobserved motivation among parents of CEC schools can er-
roneously lead to the conclusion that CEC schools raise academic achievement
relative to traditional public schools even if there is no difference in the qual-
ity of these schools. Alternatively, estimates of the effects of CEC schools on
achievement could be downward biased if CEC families have unobserved lower
socioeconomic conditions relative to families of students attending traditional
public schools.
Therefore, establishing the causal effects of CEC school attendance on aca-
demic achievement requires an exogenous source of variation in school choice.
Basic economic models of education choice suggest that schooling decisions are
based on the costs and benefits of alternative choices. In this dissertation, I
exploit geographic differences in accessibility to CEC schools as a source of ex-
ogenous variation. Using administrative data on student and school addresses,
I conduct an instrumental variables approach that uses a function of residen-
tial distance to the closest CEC school as an instrument for CEC attendance.
As I explain in detail in Chapter 2, the proposed instrument solves the unob-
served selection problem as long as the distance of a student’s residence to the
closest CEC school has a strong effect on the probability of attending a CEC
school, without affecting student outcomes directly conditional on other exoge-
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nous covariates. Intuitively, differential distances to CEC schools induce quasi-
experimental differences in transportation and opportunity costs of attending a
given CEC school, differences that are especially important for students with low
socioeconomic background for whom the decrease in costs due to CEC proxim-
ity may induce CEC school attendance.
While residential distance to the closest CEC school may in theory be corre-
lated with unobservable characteristics of students, I demonstrate using a variety
of empirical strategies that the proposed instrument is likely to be conditionally
uncorrelated to unobserved determinants of academic performance in this con-
text. The most important factor driving this conditional exogeneity is that all
CEC schools were constructed in neighborhoods with excess demand for pub-
lic education in the poorest areas of the city.9 Thus, conditional on residing in
these areas, I show that the distance from a student’s residence to the closest
CEC school is not correlated with observed family or student determinants of
academic performance and, therefore, it is likely to be uncorrelated with unob-
served determinants as well. Moreover, to further check for the direct effect of
distance on academic achievement, I perform a reduced-form placebo test using
students’ test scores for the year 2000, one year before any CEC school gradu-
ated their first class and show that CEC schools were not systematically located
in areas of the city with higher probabilities of success. In fact, if anything, the
results indicate that my instrumental variables estimates are lower bounds of the
9 The city’s Department of Education (SED) was responsible for locating and constructing all
CEC schools in Bogotá. As a result, selected providers did not have any influence on the location
of the schools.
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true causal effect on test scores as CEC schools may have been placed in neigh-
borhoods with unobserved lower than average socio-economic characteristics.
I show that, relative to public school students, CEC students scores are
around 0.6 and 0.25 standard deviations higher in math and verbal test scores,
respectively. Taken at face value, these effects reduce by a half the public-private
school achievement gap in math and verbal test scores, a significant effect con-
sidering the large differences in socio-economic characteristics between these
two population groups. The estimated results are significantly higher than OLS
estimates for CEC attendance, suggesting that the observed association between
CEC attendance and test scores is not driven by omitted variables such as higher
ability or highly motivated families among CEC students. Instead, the evidence
points to the possibility that the unobserved variables that determine selection
into CEC schools are negatively associated with academic performance.
Unlike some programs that have implemented test-based accountability
practices in public schools in the US (Koretz and Barron [1998]; Figlio and Get-
zler [2002]; Cullen and Reback [2002]; Jacob [2003, 2004]), I show that the higher
performance exhibited by CEC students are not driven by strategic responses
by CEC schools such as forcing low-performing students to either transfer or
dropout from CEC schools, or by preventing students in some other way from
taking the test. I also provide evidence that the estimated effects are not driven
by specializing in high-stakes subjects such as math and reading at the expense
of ignoring other critical areas of learning like the natural sciences. First, unlike
most standardized tests, ICFES test evaluates students on most of the curriculum
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subjects determined by the Colombian Ministry of Education,10 which reduces
the effectiveness of test preparation. Second, neither the schools nor their stu-
dents have incentives to exert more effort on only some specific subjects. From
the point of view of the schools, the academic requirements defined in the pro-
vision contracts are based on their students’ ICFES composite test scores, calcu-
lated for each student as a weighted average of all test sections. For the students,
ICFES composite test score serves as the main admission criterion to higher edu-
cation institutions in Colombia (ICFES, 1999). My instrumental variables results
indicate that attending a CEC school increases composite test scores by 0.3 stan-
dard deviations relative to public school students, suggesting that CEC schools
are not specializing in certain academic subjects.
1.4. Longer-Run Effects of CEC attendance
Interestingly, most studies on the effects of contracting out public schools
focus mostly on the short-run effects of attending privately run public schools
on test scores, with most of the existing evidence coming from evaluating US
charter schools (Angrist et. al [2010]; Abdulkadiroglu et. al, [2009]; Dobbie
and Fryer, [2009]; Hoxby and Murarka, [2009]; Hoxby and Rockoff, [2004]; Saas,
[2004]; Bifulco and Ladd, [2004]; Hanushek et. al, [2007]; Booker et. al [2007]).
Missing from these studies is an assessment of longer-run outcomes of attending
such schools such as earnings and college enrollment —outcomes that are more
10 ICFES test evaluates students on Math, Verbal, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, History, Geog-
raphy, Philosophy, and English.
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clearly tied to economic success.
In Chapter 3, I examine some longer-run effects of attending a CEC school.
Given that the ICFES test is a compulsory requirement for students intending to
enroll in college in Colombia and serves as the primary college admission crite-
rion (ICFES 1999), it seems natural to evaluate whether CEC students have been
able to translate higher ICFES test scores into high school graduation rates and
higher college enrollment rates relative to Traditional Public School (TPS) stu-
dents. The latter outcome is a relevant long term measure of school performance
given that the returns from college in Colombia have been estimated to be twice
as large as the returns from primary and secondary school (World Bank, 2003).
In addition to this outcome, I also consider whether students who attended
CEC schools are more likely to be admitted at selective universities as there is
causal evidence for Colombia showing that students who attend selective uni-
versities are more likely to have formal employment and have higher earnings
than students attending non-selective institutions (Saavedra, [2008]). However,
low-fee charging, selective, public universities in Colombia have managed to
keep a low number of admitted students (World Bank, 2003). As a result, low-
income students who traditionally graduate from TPS and CEC schools have a
hard time competing with private school students for admission into selective,
public institutions. Therefore, some public schools may be aiming at placing
their students in two-year vocational programs, specifically designed to increase
students’ odds of getting formal employment. Thus, as a third outcome, I look
at the probability of enrolling in 2-year technical and technological programs
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relative to TPS students.
Lastly, I look at the college dropout behavior of CEC students. In Colom-
bia, 50% of the students who enroll in higher education institutions drop out
from their programs (MEN, 2010). While part of this may be due to finan-
cial considerations —including inadequate student financial aid for low-income
students— it is often argued that the low-quality of secondary education is also
an important reason for dropping out from college.
To construct these higher education outcomes, I use administrative data
from the Ministry of Education on college enrollment which has student-level
information on institution and program enrollment as well as dropout behavior.
Using the same identification strategy described above, I find that that CEC
students in 2007 were 12 percentage points more likely to enroll in college. This
represents more than a 50% increase over the average college enrollment rate for
this sample.
I also find that 2007 CEC students are one percentage point more likely to
attend a selective and public institution compared to TPS students —a relatively
large effect compared to an unconditional mean of 3%. IV results also show that
CEC students are almost 8.8 and 6.5 percentage points more likely to attend a
vocational program than TPS students in the 2007 and the 2007-2008 samples,
respectively. These results represent more than an 85% increase compared to the
unconditional means of 2-year programs. This is a relevant outcome given that,
according to the Ministry of Education, 74% of the graduates from technological
programs in Colombia have formal employment —just 3 percentage points fewer
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than graduates from 5-year colleges and universities in the 2001-2009 period
(MEN, 2011). Also, graduates from technology programs have earnings equal to
75% the earnings of university graduates.
Lastly, regarding the probability of dropping out in the first two semesters
after enrolling in higher education, I find that there is not a meaningful differ-
ence in the college dropout probability.
1.5. Conclusion
In this dissertation, I evaluate a governance structure that aims at improv-
ing education quality while allowing the state to retain a fair amount of control
over the services provided. This governance structure can be broadly character-
ized by elements of the contract design and the institutional framework in which
the contracts are implemented. This program allows the SED to hold the CEC
schools accountable for the academic achievement of their students. Moreover,
the contractual arrangement aims to reduce quality-shading cost reductions by
CEC providers in a series of ways, including selecting non-profit organizations
with strong reputations.
I provide strong evidence in terms of higher test scores by CEC program
participants and some evidence on positive longer-run effects —especially, in
terms of higher college enrollment rate. The evidence, however, indicates that
the higher college participation is, to a great extent, explained by a higher prob-
ability of enrolling in two-year vocational programs. While there is some evi-
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dence that graduates from vocational programs may enjoy better labor market
outcomes, for example, in terms of the probability of being formally employed,
admission into vocational programs imposes lower requirements in terms of
ICFES test scores as admission into these programs is not as competitive.
What these results indicate is that the higher rates of college participation
are not necessarily due to the better academic performance of CEC students and
may be explained by alternative mechanisms. For example, the higher participa-
tion in vocational programs by CEC students is consistent with the intention of
some CEC schools to provide terminal vocational courses in order to smooth out
their students’ entrance to vocational programs at higher education institutions.
Therefore, it will be interesting in the future to look at other labor market out-
comes such as wages and employment which may be more relevant to evaluate
the full impact of this program.
Finally, it is also worth keeping in mind that the 2008 data on college en-
rollment seems to be incomplete given the striking difference in enrollment rel-
ative to 2007. Then, some of the results presented here on higher education
—particularly the ones using 2008 data— are to be considered preliminary as
this requires a better understanding of this discrepancy.
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Tab. 1.1. Evaluation Methodology since 2007
Component Selected Indicators Weight
Participation of Students, Teachers, Principals, and 
Concesionnaires in school government, school 
manual, and pedagogical proposals
Availability and Accessibility of education materials 
Dropout Rate
Failing Rate
Food Provision Quality and Quantity
Absolute performance in ICFES test
Relative Performance in ICFES test














Fig. 1.1.Location of TPS, New TPS, and CEC Schools
Notes: This figure shows the location of all public and CEC schools in the city as well as the students residences by type of school attended.
CEC and TPS students’ residences are depicted with dark and light gray dots, respectively. CEC and TPS locations are represented with
crossed black dots and hollow circles, respectively.
Fig. 1.2. CEC’s ICFES Performance Relative to TPS in same Locality
Notes: This figure shows confidence intervals for the composite ICFES scores difference between each CEC and all TPS located in the same locality.
For both years, CEC schools are sorted in ascending order of the 2008 CEC-TPS ICFES difference to facilitate visualization.
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Source: "Resultados de la III fase de Evaluación a Colegios en Concesión". IDEP (2010).
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2. SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF THE CEC PROGRAM
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I assess the causal effect of attending CEC schools in Bo-
gota, Colombia, on the ICFES test, a national standardized test taken by the vast
majority of high school graduates in their last year of high school. For this, I
use data for all public and CEC students in Bogota who took the ICFES test and
graduated in the second semester of 2008. Two main reasons support choosing
data from this school year. First, CEC students graduating in 2008 are likely
to have attended the same CEC school through all their secondary school years
(middle and high school).1 This point is important for at least two reasons.
Cunha et al., (2006) show that the returns to education investments are higher
the earlier these occur in the life cycle since they raise skill attainment at later
stages and facilitate the productivity of later investments. In addition to this, the
education production function depends on cumulative inputs (Hanushek [2006]).
The second reason behind the choice of the 2008 cohort is that, unlike previous
years, the ICFES test collected a large set of variables on student SES character-
istics, which I use repeatedly in the empirical analysis.
1 Secondary education in Colombia runs from 6th to 11th grades with middle school compris-
ing 6th- to 9th and high school 10th and 11th grades.
As is customary in studies of school choice, we need to pay close atten-
tion to the potential selection of program participants. Indeed, students who
attend CEC schools may differ in a number of ways from traditional public
school (henceforth, TPS) students. In this dissertation, I exploit geographic dif-
ferences in accessibility to CEC schools as a potential source of exogenous vari-
ation. In particular, I use an administrative dataset that allows me to conduct
an instrumental variables approach, using distance to the closest CEC school to
construct an instrument for CEC attendance. The proposed instrument solves
the unobserved selection problem as long as the distance of a student residence
to the closest CEC school has a strong effect on the probability of attending a
CEC school, but does not affect student outcomes directly conditional on other
exogenous covariates. Thus, special attention is paid to show that proposed in-
strument is likely to be conditionally uncorrelated to unobserved determinants
of academic performance.
The two-stage least squares estimates obtained indicate that CEC students
score 0.6 and 0.2 standard deviations higher in math and verbal tests, respec-
tively, relative to public school students. As reference, these effects reduce by a
half the public-private school achievement gap in math and verbal test scores, a
significant effect considering the large differences in socio-economic characteris-
tics between these two population groups. The estimated results are significantly
higher than OLS estimates for CEC attendance, suggesting that the observed as-
sociation between CEC attendance and test scores is not driven by omitted vari-
ables such as higher ability or highly motivated families among CEC students.
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Instead, the evidence points to the possibility that the unobserved variables that
determine selection into CEC schools are negatively associated with academic
performance. I also show that that my instrumental variables results are not
explained by treatment effect heterogeneity by students’ income levels. Lastly, I
provide evidence that the estimated results are not driven by unintended strate-
gic responses by CEC schools, such as excluding low-performing students from
the pool of test-takers or via test specialization in the curriculum.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
institutional framework of Bogota’s public education system and briefly summa-
rizes the literature on related school programs. Section 2.3 introduces the data
sources and presents some descriptive statistics of the population of interest.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe the empirical strategy and the estimation results.
Section 2.6 checks for the robustness of the results. Section 2.7 discusses the
evidence on strategic responses to test-based accountability and the plausible
mechanisms through which CEC schools are able to achieve higher academic
results than TPS. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Background
2.2.1. Public Education Sector in Bogotá
There were 1.6 million children enrolled in primary or secondary school in
Bogotá in 2008. Of these, 1.1 million children were part of the public education
system: 80% of them attended more than 340 TPS, 5% attended 25 CEC schools
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and the remaining 15% attended 332 private schools paid by the City’s Depart-
ment of Education (SED, hereafter) for taking public school students unable to
obtain a seat in existing public schools.2
Public schools in Bogotá largely educate the children of low income fam-
ilies. As expected, families self-select into schools according to their economic
means, which leaves the public schools with students from the bottom of the
income distribution. For example, data on student socioeconomic characteristics
collected at registration for ICFES test shows that 67% of students attending a
public school come from families with a monthly household income less than
two times the monthly minimum wage; this figure is just 30% for students at-
tending private schools.
Families applying for a public or CEC school for the first time must pro-
vide a preference-ranked list of up to four schools.3 Before allocating children to
schools, the SED sorts students according to the socioeconomic means of their
families. That is, students from the most economically disadvantaged house-
holds are allocated first to their most preferred options. If no seats are available
for the preferred choices, students are placed in the closest available school to
their residence with available seats. It is worth noting that this process is the
same for students attending either public or CEC schools. That is, neither TPS
or CEC schools can select their students using admission tests or similar criteria.
2 This initiative is different from a voucher program since students are not free to choose the
private school they attend, but must attend the one to which they are assigned by the SED.
Students enrolled in participating private schools usually reside in areas with excess demand
for public education.
3 Students currently enrolled in a given school are guaranteed a place in their current aca-
demic institution.
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As a result of the admission process, public schools exhibit important dif-
ferences in the observed characteristics of their students and, very likely, in their
unobserved characteristics as well. On the one hand, the allocation algorithm
gives priority to families with the lowest socioeconomic status (SES). That is, for
two students applying to a given school, the one with the lowest SES is more
likely to attend it. Thus, over subscribed schools could systematically get stu-
dents with lower than average SES. On the other hand, the SED allows students
to apply to their most preferred institutions, which may lead to selection of
most informed or motivated parents into better public schools. Consequently,
it is unclear which selection mechanism dominates in this context and, in par-
ticular, what exactly leads students to attend a CEC school. Because of this, in
order to estimate a causal effect of CEC attendance on academic achievement, an
identification strategy must account for the potential selection of CEC program
participants into CEC schools.
2.3. Data
Administrative data for this chapter come from three main sources. The
first source is ICFES, a public organization in charge of designing and admin-
istering standardized tests for all schools and universities in Colombia. For the
purposes of this study, we use the test known as Exámen de Estado (commonly
known as the ICFES test), taken by most high school students in their last year
of school, which evaluates them on the multiple subjects mentioned above. A
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rich set of demographic data on students and their families is collected at the
time of test registration, three months before the test is taken. Self-reported de-
mographic information includes, for example, gender, age, parents’ education,
number of household members, asset ownership (e.g., car, computer, cell phone,
TV, etc), household income, and residential address. In this chapter, I use the
2008 ICFES results from students attending either TPS or CEC schools and set
to graduate in the second semester of 2008. Using data from 2008, six years af-
ter the last CEC school started operating, allows me to estimate the cumulative
effect of CEC school attendance for students who presumably attended these
schools all their middle and high school years at these schools.4
The initial sample of public and CEC students graduating in the second
semester of 2008 has 50,199 observations. After excluding students who attend
night, technical, rural or military public institutions (because of concerns with
the unobservable characteristics of these students) as well as observations with
missing data for at least one of the variables (different from home address), I am
left with 39,282 observations. The percentage of missing observations over total
observations is around 6% for both CEC and TPS indicating that public students
are not more likely to fail to report their personal information than CEC students
(Table 2.1).
The second administrative data source comes from UAECD (Unidad Ad-
ministrativa de Catastro Distrital), a local government organization responsible for
4 Dropout and transfer rates from these schools are very low as shown in Figure 2.3 (Sec-
tion 2.7). Thus, even though individual years of exposure to treatment for each student is not
available, data at the school level indicates this should not be a concern.
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maintaining a database of all legal buildings in Bogotá for urban planning and
tax purposes. UAECD uses a geographic information system (GIS) that assigns
coordinates (i.e., latitude and longitude) for all buildings in the city. Thus, using
the residential address reported by students at the time of ICFES registration,
I am able to calculate the distance from a student’s home to both actual and
potential TPS and CEC schools in the city.5 As shown in Table 2.1, I am able to
match 85% of students’ addresses as reported at ICFES registration to addresses
in the UAECD database.6 In general, the absence of meaningful demographic
differences between the matched and unmatched samples suggests that we are
not left with a non-random sample of students, something that could bias the
estimated effects if, for example, students with lower SES are more likely to mis-
report their home address. The final regression sample has 33,413 observations,
including 31,783 public and 1,630 CEC students.
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the year 2008 for public and
CEC students. Panel A includes all the students used later for estimation (which
I hereafter refer as the full sample). The results indicate that, relative to students
from TPS, CEC students have slightly larger families, have less educated parents,
and come from lower income households. Moreover, CEC students are more
likely to live in low-strata neighborhoods. The stratum scheme is a six-level
classification used by the local government to characterize the socio-economic
5 Matching student addresses with the UAECD database requires addresses to be written in
the same way UAECD addresses are written. Given that less than 15% of the addresses were
exactly matched, a Stata program was created to standardize students addresses
6 It is comforting that there are no economically significant differences in the demographic
characteristics of the matched and unmatched samples as shown in Table 2.11 in Appendix C.
The same patterns persist when looking at public and CEC students respectively.
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characteristics of a given dwelling. The higher the stratum, the better the socioe-
conomic status of the dwelling. In general, residents of dwellings in the first two
strata are considered the urban poor and pay, for example, subsidized prices for
public utilities such as water and electricity. Whereas 94% of CEC students live
in the lowest two strata of the city, 66% of public students do, indicating that
the average CEC student lives in a neighborhood with very low socioeconomic
conditions. Thus, even though the average TPS student comes from a low SES
household, the average CEC school student has an even lower socio-economic
background. These figures are not surprising given that CEC schools were sys-
tematically located in strata 1 and 2 neighborhoods in peripheral areas of the
city, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Fig. 2.1.Location of CEC Schools
Notes: This figure shows the location of all the residential units and the 25 CEC schools in Bogotá. Residential units are
characterized by their stratum index. Stratum is a categorical index running from 1 to 6 and summarizes the socio-economic
status of the dwelling and its neighborhood, 1 being the lowest. Dark gray areas correspond to strata 1 and 2 neighborhoods,
medium gray to strata 3 and 4, and light gray to strata 5 and 6.
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To compare the socioeconomic characteristics of CEC and TPS students
living close to CEC schools, I select all students living in UPZs with nearby
CEC schools (henceforth, the UPZ sample —see Figure 2.4). UPZs are subdivi-
sions of the city which are used by the local administration for urban planning
purposes. The 120 UPZs in the city are defined in such a way that the urban
and economic characteristics of the housing units within them are very similar.
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for public and CEC students
in the UPZ sample. As shown, public and CEC students from the UPZ sample
are very similar along most observable dimensions. This happens because the
socioeconomic characteristics of TPS in Panel B are worse than those in Panel
A. For example, the average public student in the UPZ sample has more family
members and lower educated parents, lives in a lower stratum dwelling, and
has a lower income relative to the average public student in the full sample.
These figures provide evidence that CEC schools were located in economically
deprived areas of the city.
The last data source used in this chapter is the school surveys C600 for the
year 2008 conducted by DANE (the Colombian national department of statistics).
These surveys have detailed information for each school in the country on the
number and education level of teachers by academic grade, number of students
per grade, and the number of students who dropout or transfer at each grade.
This information is used later in Section 7 when I consider potential explanations




I begin by estimating the average differences in ICFES test scores as a func-
tion of CEC school attendance, controlling for other student, family, and neigh-
borhood characteristics. The structural equation for the outcome of interest Y
for student i in UPZ u is given by:
Yiu = ρDiu + γu + XiΓ + εiu (2.1)
where γu is a UPZ fixed effect and Xi is a vector of potential observable
determinants of academic performance, which includes all the socio-economic
variables described in Table 2.2. The regressor of interest, Diu, is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if a student attends a CEC school and is 0 otherwise.
To estimate the causal effect of CEC school attendance on academic per-
formance, the decision to attend a CEC school must be uncorrelated with un-
observed determinants of academic performance captured in the error term, εiu,
conditional on UPZ fixed effects and observable characteristics, Xi. If unobserv-
able variables that determine the selection mechanism are omitted, estimates
of CEC attendance (ρ) derived from OLS regressions in Equation 2.1 would be
inconsistent.
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2.4.2. Estimating the Causal Effect of CEC School Attendance
As stated above, the set of rules used by the SED to allocate students
into schools may facilitate self-selection of highly motivated students into CEC
schools since students are first assigned according to their stated school prefer-
ences. Were this the case, OLS estimates of CEC attendance would be upward
biased. On the other hand, the student allocation algorithm gives placement
priority to students with the lowest socioeconomic characteristics. In fact, the
evidence presented in Table 2.2 leans toward the possibility of negative selection
into CEC schools. That is, compared to the average TPS student, CEC school
students come from families with observably lower SES and live in low-income
neighborhoods. It is entirely possible, then, that there are other unobservable
characteristics which are both positively correlated with CEC school attendance
and negatively correlated with academic performance. In this case, OLS esti-
mates would be biased towards zero.
A consistent estimate for the effect of CEC attendance on academic per-
formance can be recovered if there is at least one variable Z that, in addition
to being uncorrelated with the error term in Equation 2.1, is also a strong pre-
dictor of the probability of attending a CEC school in the following first stage
regression
Diu = αZi + λu + Xiβ + µiu (2.2)
37
where Diu is the indicator variable for CEC attendance of individual i in
UPZ u, λu is a UPZ fixed effect, Xi is a vector of the student’s socioeconomic
characteristics and µiu is an error term. The causal effect of CEC attendance
on academic achievement then can be estimated using Two-Stage Least Squares
(hereafter, 2SLS).
Note that, although a properly defined education production function should
include school level variables that affect academic performance (e.g., teacher
quality, student-teacher ratios, school facilities, ect.), the only school-level vari-
able included in this model is the CEC attendance variable Diu. As a result, this
variable should be interpreted as the aggregate effect of attending a CEC school
on achievement without explicitly pinning down the mechanisms at work. Two
reasons drive this methodological decision. First, including school level vari-
ables will further complicate the identification strategy and the interpretation of
the results as more instruments will be needed for every additional school level
variable included. Second, even with additional valid instruments, including
additional school level variables will prevent us from estimating the aggregate
effect of participating in the CEC school program, which is one of the main goals
of this research project. Nevertheless, I devote a great deal of attention to the
differences in school level inputs in Section 2.7 and discuss what may be (and
may not be) the mechanisms behind the estimated results.
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2.4.3. Using Distance to the Closest CEC School as an Instrument
To estimate the causal effect of attending a CEC school on academic achieve-
ment, I exploit variation in distance from a student’s residence to the closest CEC
institution to construct an instrument for CEC attendance. For a function of dis-
tance to the closest CEC school to be a good instrument for CEC attendance, two
conditions are required. First, the distance of a student’s residence to the closest
CEC school should have a strong effect on the probability of attending a CEC
school. Second, for instrument validity, 2SLS should retain only the variation in
the probability of CEC attendance that is generated by the quasi-experimental
variation generated by the instrument. Intuitively, 2SLS allows us to compare
the academic performance of students who differ in their propensity to attend
a CEC school just because they reside various distances from these institutions.
That is, distance to the closest CEC school should not be correlated with other
unobserved determinants of academic performance. In this section, I show that
the proposed distance instrument is both a valid and relevant instrument for
CEC attendance.
An Instrument for CEC Attendance
The idea of using distance as an instrument has been exploited before. In the
economics of education literature, Card (1993) estimated the returns to school-
ing using variation in college proximity. Distance-based instruments have also
been exploited in the health economics literature (McClellan, [1994]; Kessler and
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McClellan, [2000]; Freedman, [2010]), in studies of the effects of child subsidies
on children wellbeing (Herbst and Tekin, [2010]), and the impact of community
nurseries on low-income children nutrition in Colombia (Attanasio, [2010]).
There are different ways to implement distance to the closest CEC as an
instrument for CEC school attendance. For the empirical strategy, I define the
instrument in terms of distance to the closest CEC school relative to the closest
TPS. Two main reasons justify this decision. First, a relative distance instrument
should have more power for those students who, in spite of living far from a
CEC school, live even further away from a TPS. Second, it allows me to define a
categorical instrument that takes the value of 1 if a student lives closer to a CEC
school than to a TPS (i.e., for negative relative distances) and 0 otherwise. That
is,





and dij is the distance from student’s i residence to school j ∈ [c, p]
Using a categorical instrument is partly driven by the non-linear relation-
ship between relative distance to CEC school and CEC attendance probability.
That is, relative distance in meters should be a strong predictor for CEC at-
tendance only for students living within a certain distance from a CEC school,
and be rather ineffective for students who live relatively far from it. Figure 2.5
presents evidence on this point. It shows the fraction of total students attending
a CEC school who live within a given interval of relative distance. This figure
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shows that whenever a student lives closer to a CEC than to a TPS (i.e., relative
distance is negative), there is a higher probability of attending a CEC school.
More importantly, for almost all the distance intervals for which a student lives
closer to a TPS than to a CEC school (i.e. positive relative distance), the fraction
of CEC students is not only small, but also non-decreasing in relative distance.
To account for these non-linearities in the CEC attendance probability, I
could partition the continuous instrument into several categorical variables for
different intervals of relative distance. As it turns out, however, using a single
categorical instrument that takes the value of 1 for students who live relatively
closer to CEC schools (and 0 otherwise), exhibits the strongest effect on the
probability of attending a CEC school as indicated by the F-test statistic in the
first-stage specifications compared to a wide range of alternatives, including
specifications with high order polynomials or multiple categorical instruments.
Instrument Relevance
Basic Economic models of education suggests that the school choice decision
by a household is made by maximizing the difference between the expected
returns and costs of attending a given school. The expected returns to attending
a school are a function of the quality of the education provided. In turn, the
costs of attending a public school are mainly determined by transportation and
opportunity costs for both the students and their parents who usually need to
walk their young children to school. Note that both of these costs are increasing
in the distance from a student’s residence to a given school.
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The expected returns to attending a given school depend on the informa-
tion set available to households. However, there is only partial public infor-
mation on the quality of public schools in Bogotá. In fact, the only existing
source of public information on school quality is average ICFES test scores at
the school level, available online for each of the test subjects. Even if parents
of public school students use this information to guide their school choice de-
cision, Table 2.2 shows that unconditional test score means for CEC schools are
less than 0.1 standard deviations higher relative to TPS. Moreover, given that
few cohorts have graduated from CEC schools, there is also limited information
from this source that might significantly affect the expectation of the returns
to CEC school attendance. Thus, given the information set available to public
school users, the expected returns to attending a CEC school may not be very
different from attending a TPS.
On the other hand, transportation and opportunity costs of sending a child
to a school far from home can be prohibitive for most of these households.
Monthly public transportation expenditures for a single person represent 15%
of a monthly minimum wage. Also, due to traffic congestion, the average speed
of public transportation in the city is around 14MPH,7 meaning that having to
commute to a school far from home may significantly reduce the time that both
children and their parents could otherwise use for work or housework. It can
be argued that some households could find it optimal to assume one-time res-
7 Source: Instituto de Estudios Urbanos, Universidad Nacional. www.redBogotá.com last
visited on October 10, 2010.
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idence reallocation costs in order to reduce the costs of attending a preferred
school. There is no evidence, however, that housing and school locations in Bo-
gotá are jointly determined by public student households. The 2007 Encuesta de
Calidad de Vida, a locality-representative household survey in Bogotá, shows
that, even though 21% of the households change their residence every 2 years,
just 4% of them move due to education or health considerations.
This simple framework suggests that parents’ maximization problem in
the current environment boils down to sending their children to schools where
it is less costly to do so, that is, to schools close to their residence. Figure 2.6
shows the proportion of students in the sample who live within a given distance
interval from the school they actually attend. Approximately 15% of all students
in the sample live within 300 meters (0.18 miles) from their school. Moreover,
the cumulative distribution for both CEC and TPS students shows that 73% of
them live fewer than 2000 meters (1.24 miles) from the school they attend. I
interpret this as evidence that residential distance to schools determine the set
of potential schools available to low income students in Bogotá.
More importantly, this framework suggests that functions of distance to the
closest CEC school could be used as an instrument for CEC school attendance as
differential distances to CEC schools generates quasi-experimental differences in
the costs of attending a given CEC school. The empirical evidence supports the
idea that living close to a CEC school is a strong predictor of the probability of
attending a CEC school. First, Figure 2.7 shows that CEC students’ residences
(dark gray dots) cluster around CEC school locations (crossed black dots). More-
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over, data collected by five of the 25 CEC schools on students’ transportation
choices indicates that around 90% of CEC students walk to school and for 95%
of them it takes less than 25 minutes to get to school as shown in Figure 2.8.
A third piece of evidence is presented in Figure 2.2, which shows the distribu-
tion of students living at various relative distances from the closest CEC school.
The figure shows that the empirical distribution for CEC students stochastically
dominates the TPS distribution for negative values of relative distance (i.e., the
closest CEC school is closer than the closest TPS). In contrast, those living closer
to a TPS relative to a CEC school are more likely to attend the former. This
figure motivates the use of the categorical instrument previously defined.
More formally, first stage results presented in Section 5 show there is, in





















































Relative Distance to Closest CEC (Meters)
CEC Students
Public Students
Fig. 2.2.Distribution of Relative Distance to Closest CEC
Notes: This figure shows the empirical distributions of relative distance in meters for both CEC and TPS students. Relative
distance is defined as the distance to the closest CEC school minus the distance to the closest TPS. The figure graphically
depicts the categorical instrument defined in Equation 3.1.
Instrument Validity
The second condition for distance to be a good instrument for CEC attendance is
that the only relationship between the outcomes of interest and the instrument
is through the first stage. This condition, known as the exclusion restriction, im-
plies that the instrument should be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants
of academic achievement. One concern is that families jointly determine their
school choice and residence. Card’s (1995) college proximity instrument, for ex-
ample, has been questioned on grounds of the joint decision between schooling
and residence in the US since families with a higher taste for education may also
choose to live near a college institution (Kling, 2001). Although the validity of
an instrument is a non-testable condition, Altonji et al (2005) argue that if an in-
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strument is uncorrelated with a rich set of observable characteristics, it is likely
to be uncorrelated with unobserved outcome determinants.
To check for instrument exogeneity, Table 2.3 reports coefficients from OLS
regressions of the socio-economic characteristics indicated in each row on the
instrument, for specifications with and without UPZ fixed effects. The results in
Column (2), which correspond to a specification without UPZ fixed effects and
uses all the observations in the full sample, shows that living relatively closer to
a CEC school is correlated with some of the students’ observable characteristics
such as low parent education levels, living in stratum 2, not living in stratum
3, coming from a low monthly income household, and less likely to have a
computer, home internet service or a car. These results are not surprising as
they just confirm that CEC schools were located in low-income areas of the city.
In fact, after conditioning on UPZ fixed effects in Column (3), the results indicate
that relative distance is not systematically correlated with student socioeconomic
characteristics. Moreover, using observations only from the UPZ sample, which
is an alternative way of controlling for neighborhood characteristics near CEC
schools, confirms the absence of correlation between the instrument and the
rest of the exogenous covariates. I interpret this as evidence that the proposed
relative distance instrument is exogenous conditional on UPZ fixed effects.
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2.5. Results
This section estimates 2SLS specifications of CEC attendance on academic
achievement. To account for the possibility of correlation of student outcomes
within a given neighborhood, all regression estimates are clustered at the UPZ
level using a paired bootstrap strategy that samples at the UPZ level.
2.5.1. First Stage Estimates
In this section I present the first stage estimates of the effect of living rela-
tively closer to a CEC school than to a TPS on the probability of CEC attendance.
I provide evidence that the instrument is strongly correlated with attending a
CEC school and additional evidence that the proposed instrument satisfies the
exclusion restriction.
Table 2.4 shows the estimates of linear probability models for CEC school
attendance on the categorical relative distance instrument and different sets of
exogenous regressors.8 Columns (1) to (3) show the results for the full regression
sample. Column (1), which only includes the instrument as a regressor, indicates
that living closer to a CEC than to a TPS increases the probability of attending a
CEC by 17 percentage points. Once UPZ fixed effects are added in Column (2),
the estimated effect is reduced to 10 percentage points. Furthermore, adding the
rich set of exogenous covariates in Column (3) do not change the point estimates
of the instruments. I interpret the stability of these estimates as evidence in favor
8 The full set of first stage estimates are presented in Table 2.9 of Appendix B.
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of the exclusion restriction conditional on UPZ fixed effects.
At the bottom of the table, I also report the correct prediction rate for these
linear probability models as well as F-statistics on the excluded instrument to
assess the relevance of the instrument. The F-statistics for the specifications with
UPZ fixed effects using the full sample are 27.64 and 27.83, well above the con-
ventional critical values to assess finite sample bias due to weak instruments.
Moreover, the correct prediction rates of these two specifications are above 71%.
That is, both measures suggest that the proposed instrument is a strong predic-
tor of CEC attendance. The results for Panel B, which includes only students
living in UPZs with nearby CEC schools, largely replicate the results of the full
sample, although the instrument is even stronger for this sample, as indicated
by the large F-statistics in all three specifications in Columns (4) to (6).
2.5.2. 2SLS Estimates
Table 2.5 presents both OLS and 2SLS results of CEC school attendance
on math, verbal, and the composite ICFES test scores measured in number of
standard deviations for both the full and UPZ samples and for different sets of
exogenous covariates and UPZ fixed effects.
I report OLS and 2SLS estimates of CEC attendance on test scores in Table
2.5. OLS estimates for all specifications (no covariates, UPZ fixed effects only,
and covariates along with UPZ fixed effects) in both samples indicate that CEC
students score 0.16, 0.18, and 0.13 standard deviations higher than TPS students
in math, verbal, and the composite ICFES tests, respectively.
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Drawing from evidence I have provided that relative distance to a CEC
school is exogenous conditional on UPZ fixed effects, I first focus on the results
from Column (2), using observations from the full sample. 2SLS estimates show
that attending a CEC school increases math, verbal, and the composite test scores
by 0.52sd, 0.15sd, and 0.3sd, respectively, relative to TPS students, although the
effect on the verbal test is imprecise. The 2SLS results in Column (3) shows
that CEC attendance estimates are practically insensitive to the inclusion of the
remaining exogenous covariates. As before, the stability of the estimates in Col-
umn (3) provides evidence on instrument exogeneity conditional on UPZ fixed
effects. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates using observations from the UPZ sample
exhibit very similar magnitudes and significance levels.
The lower gains in verbal test scores suggests that CEC schools have a
stronger impact on some academic fields than others. Interestingly, this fact is
consistent with the results found in both the charter school and test-based ac-
countability literature in the US, where the gains in math are always larger than
the gains in verbal test scores (see, for example, Abdulkadiroglu et. al., 2009;
Chiang, 2009; Dobbie and Fryer, 2009; Jacob, 2005;). Note also that 2SLS esti-
mates for the math and the composite tests are more than 4 and 3 times larger
than the OLS estimates, respectively. This supports the claim that students at-
tending CEC schools are different from public students in some unobservable
dimensions that negatively affect test scores, which causes the OLS estimates to
be downward biased. More formally, a Hausman exogeneity test of the equality
of the OLS and 2SLS estimates is conducted through a paired-bootstrap proce-
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dure that samples at the UPZ level to account for correlation of student outcomes
within UPZs.9 The results indicate that OLS and 2SLS estimates of CEC atten-
dance for the math and composite tests are statistically different at the 5% and
10% significance levels, respectively. While the 2SLS estimated effect for the ver-
bal test is 58% higher than the OLS estimate (0.208 vs 0.131) in Column (3), I
cannot reject that they are statistically equal.
To assess the magnitude of the estimates, I compare the effect of attending
a CEC school with some of the estimates of the socio-economic determinants of
test scores, presented in Table 2.10 in Appendix B. For example, the estimates
for the math test in Column (1) show that having parents with at most primary
education reduce math test results by 0.12 standard deviations relative to col-
lege educated parents and living in a stratum 1 neighborhood decreases math
test scores by 0.1 standard deviations relative to living in stratum 4. Similarly,
coming from a household with a monthly income less than one monthly mini-
mum wage reduces math test scores by 0.2 standard deviations relative to those
earning 4 or more times the minimum wage. These effects are significantly lower
than the estimated 0.6 standard deviations effect of CEC attendance on the math
test.
I also compare these results with respect to the average performance of pri-
vate school students in Bogotá taking the test in the second semester of 2008.10
9 Given that the standard errors allow for correlation at the UPZ level, the variance covariance
matrices under the Hausman null hypothesis are not asymptotically efficient as required. Thus,
a 5000-repetition, paired bootstrap strategy that samples at the UPZ level with replacement is
conducted in order to construct a consistent difference between the 2SLS and OLS variance-
covariance matrices.
10 The ICFES test is conducted two times a year as there are 2 different school calendars, one
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As mentioned earlier, the choice between private and public schools in Bogotá
is largely determined by income. On average, private school students score one
standard deviation higher than TPS in math and 0.5 standard deviations higher
in verbal and the composite test. Altogether, the estimated effects for CEC atten-
dance suggest that attending a CEC school reduce by a half the public-private
school achievement gap, a significant effect considering the large differences in
socio-economic characteristics between these two population groups.
2.6. Robustness Checks
In this section I explore the robustness of the results in two ways. First,
I conduct a placebo test to further check for instrument exogeneity. Second, I
also check whether the estimated effects of CEC attendance are driven by some
specific population groups.
2.6.1. A Placebo Test
The fundamental claim that justifies using an IV strategy to identify the
causal effect of interest is that the only reason why test scores change as the
instruments change is through the variation that the instruments have on CEC
attendance. That is, there should be no relation between the instrument and test
scores in samples where there is no relationship between CEC school attendance
and the instruments.
for the period February-December and the other for August-June. While all public and CEC
schools operate in the first calendar, private schools operate in both.
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In order to further assess the validity of the instrument, I construct a
placebo test using ICFES data from the year 2000, one year before CEC schools
graduated their first class. The idea is to construct the same categorical relative
distance instrument used earlier for estimation on a sample for which the in-
strument should not be relevant. To do this, I first georeference the residential
address of public students who took the ICFES test in the second semester of
2000. Then, I construct a variation of residential relative distance to the closest
CEC school as introduced earlier in Equation 3.1. Recall that relative distance
is defined as the distance to the closest CEC school minus the distance to the
closest TPS. Note, however, that it is not possible to calculate the actual distance
to the closest CEC school for high school students taking the ICFES test in 2000
because CEC schools were not available for these students in that year. Instead,
I calculate the distance for all TPS students in the sample to the closest poten-
tial CEC school to construct a measure of relative distance. Then, I define the
instrument as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if potential relative
distance is negative and 0 otherwise.
The placebo test consists of estimating reduced form specifications, that is,
estimating the effect of the dummy instrument on the math, verbal, and overall
test scores. More specifically, the reduced form specification is given by:
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Yiu = δZi + φu + XiΠ + ξiu, where (2.4)






That is, PRDi is the potential relative distance for student i, pdic is the potential
distance of student i to CEC school c, and dip is the actual distance from student’s
i residence to TPS p. Note that a positive reduced form effect of the instrument
on test scores would question the exogeneity of the instrument for it would
imply, for example, that CEC schools were strategically located in areas of the
city with a higher probability of academic success.
Reduced form estimates of the instrument on ICFES test scores, δ, are pre-
sented in Table 2.6 for both 2000 and 2008 academic years. As before, I focus on
the results from Column (3) and (6), which are the specifications with the full set
of UPZ fixed effects and exogenous covariates. The reduced form estimates of
the effect of living relatively closer to a CEC school on the math and verbal tests
in the year 2000 are slightly negative and not statistically different from zero.
The estimated effect on the composite test score in both samples is also nega-
tive and not different from zero in the UPZ sample. In contrast, all the reduced
form effects using 2008 data show a significant positive effect of living relatively
closer to a CEC school. These results provide strong evidence that the estimated
effects of CEC attendance are not due to schools being strategically located in
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areas with a higher probability of academic success. If anything, the negative re-
duced form estimates for the year 2000 indicate that CEC schools may have been
constructed in neighborhoods with lower than average SES even within UPZs.
In that case, the 2SLS estimates for CEC attendance would be lower bounds of
the true causal estimate. However, most of the 2000 reduced form estimates
either in the specification in Column (3) in the full sample or in all the specifi-
cations using the UPZ sample show the year 2000 reduced form estimates are
insignificant. Thus, I interpret the results from this test as additional evidence
on the statistical validity of the instrument. 11
2.6.2. Characterizing Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Up to this point, the estimated effects of CEC attendance have been as-
sumed to be the same for all students in the data. However, with treatment
effect heterogeneity, IV estimates can be interpreted as a weighted average of
causal effects for particular subgroups of the population (i.e., the compliers) for
whom the treatment status is changed by the instrument. The estimated effect
is known as the local average treatment effect, or LATE (Imbens and Angrist,
[1994]). Card (1993), for example, argues that the effect of college proximity
on college attendance should be more important for children of less wealthy
households. That is, what pushes some low-income students into college is the
11 One concern with this placebo test, however, is whether students graduating in 2000 actually
lived close to where potential CEC schools were later located, that is, whether student are simi-
larly distributed in the city in both years. To evaluate this point, Figure 2.9 shows the empirical
distributions of relative distance in meters for both 2000 and 2008 academic years. The large
similarities of these distributions suggest that results for year 2000 are not driven because of a
disproportionately low amount of public students in future CEC school areas.
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reduction in the costs due to college proximity. As a result, Card’s IV estimates
of the return of college attendance can be interpreted as the return to college
only for students from less wealthy households who are credit constrained in
financing college.
In order to assess possible treatment heterogeneity by income levels, I first
construct a socio-economic index on the sample of students who live closer to
a TPS than to a CEC school using all the observable characteristics used earlier
in estimation. This index is constructed as the predicted probability of being a
very-low income household.12
Panel A of Table 2.7 shows descriptive statistics of selected student socio-
economic characteristics by quartiles of the constructed SES index. By construc-
tion, students from the lowest quartile have larger families, lower parental ed-
ucation and income, and a higher probability of living in low strata neighbor-
hoods. Following Kling (2001), the overall weight received for each group q
when using 2SLS is given by
ωq|x = Wqλq|x∆Dq|x/ ∑
q
Wqλq|x∆Dq|x (2.5)
That is, conditional on the exogenous covariates X, the weight given by
2SLS to a specific quartile q is formed by three components. The first is the
proportion of observations that belong to quartile q, Wq. Second, 2SLS weights
12 In practice, this is equivalent to being a SISBEN 1 household. SISBEN is a poverty-targeting
index used by the Colombian government to determine eligibility for social programs. The index
takes on 6 values, where only levels 1 and 2 are eligible for most government subsidies and is
constructed from a rich set of variables such as housing materials, access to public utilities,
ownership of durable assets, demographic composition, educational attainment, and labor force
participation.
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the observations by the average conditional variance of the instrument estimated
over the empirical distribution of X for each q, that is, λq|x = E[P[Z|X, q](1−
P[Z|X, q])|q]. The last term reflects the average impact of the instrument on CEC
attendance for quartile q, ∆Dq|x = E[E[D|Z = 1, X, q]− E[D|Z = 0, X, q]|q].
Estimates of ωq|x in Equation 2.5 and its components are presented in Panel
B of Table 2.7. The results in this table show that the two lowest quartiles receive
marginally higher weights than the last two quartiles. That is, they receive just
58% of the total weight. I also estimate the causal effect of CEC attendance on the
math, verbal, and composite ICFES scores by income quartiles. Both the weights
that each quartile receive as well as the estimated causal effects by income quar-
tiles speak of a rather homogeneous treatment effect of the CEC program. This
does not contradict the idea that the way the instrument operates is by lowering
the costs of attending a CEC school. In fact, given that all students attending
TPS belong to households with low socio-economic characteristics, it is not sur-
prising that they respond similarly to cost reductions in school attendance.
2.7. Mechanisms for Higher Academic Achievement
Understanding the mechanisms that improve a student’s academic out-
comes is a relevant policy question. This section discusses some possible mech-
anisms through which CEC schools achieve better academic performance. First,
I evaluate whether CEC schools responded strategically to the imposed account-
ability system in ways similar to the ones referenced in the test-based account-
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ability literature. Second, I explore other dimensions in which CEC schools
are different from TPS (besides higher flexibility and accountability) to assess
whether these differences are the driving force behind the higher academic
achievement of CEC students.
2.7.1. Strategic Responses
One potential concern with evaluating schools according to the perfor-
mance of their students in standardized tests is the possibility that schools would
respond by devoting more instruction time to high-stakes subjects at the expense
of other critical areas such as the natural sciences. That is, given that most stan-
dardized tests only evaluate students’ math and reading skills, there are strong
incentives to increase test-specific skills in these areas (Johnson, [1984]; Koretz
and Barron, [1998]; Jacob, [2005]).
This concern is largely addressed in the present context by virtue of the
design of the ICFES exam, which evaluates students on most subjects included
in the standard academic curriculum defined by the Colombian Ministry of Edu-
cation. Moreover, the composite ICFES test score is calculated as a weighted av-
erage of ICFES test sections that also penalizes students for specializing in some
subjects by using a linear function of the student’s standard deviation.13 As
shown in Section 5, CEC students score around 0.3 standard deviations higher
than TPS students in the composite test. These results suggest that CEC schools
13 the overall test score for student i is given by Scorei = ∑c{Wc ∗ Scorec,i} −
σi
2 , where
c=[Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Math, Verbal, Social Sciences, Philosophy, English], weights
given by Wc = (1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1) and σi equal to student’s i standard deviation from all c test
components.
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are not responding to increased test-based accountability by specializing in some
academic subjects. Part of this is explained by students’ incentives to perform
well in all test sections since ICFES composite test score serves as the main (and
sometimes only) criterion for admission to two-year and four-year colleges and
universities in Colombia. But also, academic accountability for CEC schools is
contractually defined in terms of this composite score.
This is an important finding for policy reasons because it suggests that
evaluating students on multiple subjects should make test-based accountability
programs less likely to be explained by test specialization as long as incentives
are defined in terms of composite scores.
A second potential response to test-based accountability is to prevent low-
performing students from taking the test by making them transfer or drop out
from a given school. Unfortunately, information on dropout or transfer students
is not available at the student level. To account for these possibilities, I use data
from the C-600 national school survey in 2008, which collects data on teacher
and student characteristics at the school level. In particular, this survey collects
information on the number of students per academic grade as well as the num-
ber of students per grade either transferring or dropping-out. For a given school
and grade, the transfer (dropout) rate is calculated as the number of students
who transfer (drop out) over the total number of students in that grade. Then,
for each academic grade, I calculate the average transfer (dropout) rate among all
schools which offer that academic grade14 weighted by the total number of stu-
14 Unlike CEC schools, most TPS do not offer all academic levels from primary to high school
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dents in that school-grade combination. If CEC schools exhibit higher average
transfer or dropout rates, this would suggest that higher academic performance
in CEC schools is achieved by dismissing low-performing students.
Results on average rates are presented in Figure 2.3 for three different
school samples: all TPS, TPS in the UPZ sample, and CEC schools. Results
for TPS in the UPZ sample are included to assess whether TPS in this sample
UPZs are more similar to CEC schools than the average TPS in the city. The
figure shows that the average dropout rate for primary (1st to 5th), middle (6th
to 9th), and high school (10th to 11th) grades in TPS are 3%, 5%, and 4%, respec-
tively. In contrast, CEC schools have average dropout rates slightly above 1% for
all academic grades. Interestingly, there are no meaningful differences between
the rates for TPS in the full and UPZ samples. Moreover, the results on average
transfer rates also indicate that whereas TPS transfer 2.5% of their students in
each grade, CEC schools transfer just 1% of their students. Rather than being
a concern, these results indicate that CEC schools are actually more successful
than TPS at keeping students enrolled in school.
A third potential unintended response is to prevent low-performing stu-
dents from taking the ICFES test or, equivalently, to have students self-select
into taking the test. A low test taking rate by CEC students would suggest that
the higher academic achievement of CEC schools is due to differences in the
composition of test takers. To evaluate this possibility, I construct a test taking
rate for each school in the sample. For a given school, the test taking rate is
but are primary, middle, or high school only.
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Transfer Rates by Academic Grade
Fig. 2.3.Dropout and Transfer Rates by School Type
Notes: Author’s Calculations from 2008 School Survey C-600. This figure shows the average dropout (transfer) rate by grade
and school type for both the full regression sample and the UPZ sample. Averages are weighted by the total number of
students at each school. Dropout (Transfer) rate is defined as the number of students who dropped out (transfer) from a
given school and grade over the total number of students in that grade-school combination.
defined as the total number of students taking the test in the second semester of
2008 over the total number of students in grade 11 as reported in the 2008 C-600
survey. Test taking-rates for TPS is approximately 93% to 96% of CEC schools.
Moreover, the high test taking rates exhibited by both school types provides
evidence on how serious schools and students are about the ICFES test.
The existing evidence does not indicate that CEC schools are strategically
responding to increased accountability by preventing low-performing students
from affecting school results —or at least no more than the average TPS. It is
possible that students who drop out, transfer, or do not take the test are more
likely to come from the bottom part of the potential score distribution. How-
ever, given that CEC schools outperform TPS in all these dimensions, then 2SLS
estimates of CEC attendance on test scores would be lower bounds of the true
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causal effect of interest.
2.7.2. Alternative Mechanisms
Determining the mechanisms that drive the higher academic achievement
of CEC schools is relevant for policy reasons. In this section I discuss some
potential mechanisms that may explain the higher academic results of CEC stu-
dents. First, I look at input differences between public and CEC schools that have
been associated with education quality in the education literature. In particu-
lar, I look at teachers’ education, student-teacher ratios and annual expenditure
per student. Table 2.8 summarizes the results. Regarding teachers’ education,
TPS have more highly educated teachers relative to CEC schools at all academic
levels. For example, whereas 47% of public middle school teachers have a grad-
uate degree, only 11% of primary CEC school teachers do. This result is not
surprising since teachers’ salaries in TPS are partly determined by educational
attainment. Thus, TPS teachers find it optimal to invest in their own education,
regardless of graduate program quality. In contrast, at least 75% of CEC school
teachers have at most a college degree in Education.
Second, the data indicates that that both TPS and CEC schools have almost
identical student-teacher ratios in primary and middle school grades of 40 and
30 students per teacher, respectively. For high school grades, CEC schools have
a ratio of 21 students per teacher compared to 30 students in TPS. Third, the
annual cost of a CEC student to the city is lower than the cost of a TPS student.
The higher operational costs of TPS are primarily driven by the higher educa-
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tional attainment of their teachers relative to CEC schools (Contraloria Distrital,
2003).
In principle, none of these three factors can explain the higher academic
achievement by CEC schools. If anything, having more educated teachers and
higher spending per student should increase academic performance of TPS.
Also, given that the difference in student teacher ratios between CEC and TPS
only exists in the last two years of high school, it is unlikely that the estimated
results are driven by this factor. In any case, the literature of the effects of school
resources on achievement such as teacher’s education, student-teacher ratios
and student expenditures are far from conclusive, even in studies that exploit
exogenous sources of variation [Hanushek, 1986, 1996, 2006].15
2.7.3. A Contract for Academic Achievement
The CEC program implemented in Bogotá provides strong empirical sup-
port for the case of private provision of public education through service-provision
contracts. In particular, the existing institutional design exhibits gains in educa-
tion quality, while limiting the opportunities for inefficient cost reductions.
The factors that explain the gains in quality are primarily due to private
operators being contractually subject to annual performance evaluations, which
includes rules for the academic performance of their students in standardized
tests. Moreover, in addition to holding CEC schools academically accountable,
15 For example, in a review of 376 studies on resources and student performance using US data,
Hanushek (2006) finds that in 86% of the studies teachers’ education does not improve student
performance; 72% do not find evidence of a positive effect of lower student-teacher ratios; and,
66% do not find an effect of higher expenditure per student.
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schools themselves are able to hold teachers accountable for the academic per-
formance of their students. It is unlikely that academic performance would
improve were the schools not allowed to demand results from teachers.
Nevertheless, the arguments against private provision of public services
are related to the part of quality that is not contractible in nature. The CEC pro-
gram addresses potentially harmful cost reductions in a variety of ways. First,
students are allowed to choose the schools they want to attend and private op-
erators are paid according to the number of students enrolled up to school ca-
pacity. This creates a potential competition effect that softens quality-reducing
decisions. Moreover, schools are not able to select their students in any way and
were not able to select the school locations in order to prevent CEC schools to
systematically select profitable students at the expense of unprofitable ones (e.g.,
problematic, low-performing students).
Second, to further attenuate incentives for cost reductions, contracts were
assigned to not-for-profit, well regarded institutions. The critical characteristic of
a non-profit firm is that it is barred from distributing any profits it earns to those
who exercise control over it. As a result, profits are usually used to improve the
quality of the service (Glaeser and Shleifer, [1998]). This is in fact the case for the
CEC program. Although public and CEC schools in Bogotá have similar costs
per student, TPS used 30 percent more of their annual budget to pay for teachers
wages in 2002 (Cotraloria Distrital, 2003). Additional resources were invested by
CEC schools in food provision and school supplies for students. Moreover, by
assigning contracts to respected schools and universities, providers should face
63
large costs from choosing lower non-contractible quality in the form of lower
reputation of their own private institutions. Also, given that service provision
contracts in Colombia are subject to renewal for at most 50% of the length of the
original contract, lower reputation due to reduced quality inflicts large costs on
CEC providers interested in contract renewal.
It is also possible that not-for-profit, well regarded organizations have a
genuine preference from providing goods of higher quality derived from altru-
istic behavior (Rose-Ackerman, [1996]; Lakdawalla and Philipson, [1998]). In
fact, inspection of CEC school budgets show that they are investing in potential
quality-improving activities that are not part of their annual evaluation process
such as psychological attention to children, remedial education programs, or
sending school social workers to visit the household of students who have re-
cently stopped attending school.
Third, to avoid ex-post opportunistic behavior by CEC providers, owner-
ship of school facilities and supplies —the most specific assets of this contrac-
tual arrangement— was retained by the state. By doing so, the SED aimed at
retaining residual contract rights in uncontracted circumstances (Joskow, 1988).
One final factor that prevents significant reductions in non-contractible
quality lies in the nature of education provision along with the wage structure in
the education sector in Colombia. Providing education is a labor intensive ser-
vice with labor costs accounting for an important fraction of total expenditures.
This is even more pronounced for CEC schools given that the state is the formal
owner of the school facilities and is therefore responsible for major infrastructure
64
investments. More importantly, wages in Colombia for both private and public
teaches are regulated by law. As a result, although CEC schools could find cost
reduction opportunities by hiring lower quality workers at lower wages, the le-
gal constraints on teacher wages provide incentives for these schools to hire the
best teachers willing to work for them.
2.8. Conclusion
This chapter presents estimates of the causal effects on academic achieve-
ment of attending a contracted out public school in Bogotá, Colombia. Instru-
mental variables estimates constructed by using a distance-based instrument
controlling for neighborhood fixed effects and a rich set of exogenous covariates
consistently show a large positive association between program participation
and academic achievement. These effects are largest and significant for the math
test as well as for the composite test, which evaluates students in most middle-
and high-school academic subjects included in the Colombian standard curricu-
lum. The results for the verbal test, while positive, are imprecise. I also provide
a variety of empirical strategies to argue that, conditional on taking the test, the
proposed instrument is indeed exogenous.
Although standardized tests have been used as proxies for school quality,
higher academic results in standardized tests do not necessarily translate into
longer-run gains in potentially more meaningful outcomes. Evans and Schwab
(1995), for example, argue that standardized tests are limited measures of a
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student’s ability, creativity or deeper problem-solving skills. In Chapter 3, I
examine the longer-run effects of CEC school attendance using administrative
data on college level enrollment (2- and 4-year programs), major choice, and
college academic performance.
This chapter also explores some plausible factors that may have driven the
higher academic results of contracted out public schools. Using school-level
data, I argue that the higher academic achievement of these schools is unlikely
to be explained by unintended strategic responses to increased test account-
ability. If anything, the lower socio-economic characteristics of student partici-
pants and the lower dropout and transfer rates as well as the higher test taking
rates of these schools indicate the estimated effects are lower bounds of the true
causal effect. Moreover, using school level data on education inputs show that
contracted-out schools exhibit higher levels of academic achievement, despite
having lower educated teachers and similar student-teacher ratios and expendi-
tures per student.
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Tab. 2.1.Sample Exclusion Criteria
Public CEC Total
(1) (2) (3)
Initial Sample: Students taking 2008 ICFES Test and Graduating in 2008 48,125 2,074 50,199
Exclusion criteria (total cases)
Night Schools 4,033 0 4,033
Technical Schools (including Teacher Schools) 3,417 0 3,417
Military Schools 239 0 239
Rural Schools 151 0 151
Observations with missing data (different from address) 2,931 146 3,077
Missing observations / Initial Sample (%) 0.061 0.070 0.061
Subtotal (Initial Sample minus excluded observations) 37,354 1,928 39,282
Minus observations with unmatched address 5,571 298 5,869
Unmatched observations / Total non-excluded observations (%) 0.15 0.15 0.15
Matched observations / Total non-excluded observations (%) 0.85 0.85 0.85
Final Regression Sample 31,783 1,630 33,413
Notes: This table presents the sample construction for regression analyzes. The initial sample of public and CEC
students graduating in the second semester of 2008 has 50,199 observations. The sample reduces to 31,783 observa-
tions after excluding students who attend night, technical, rural or military public institutions, have missing data for
at least one of the variables, or were nor succesfully assigned a valid residential address from the UAECD database.
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Tab. 2.2.Descriptive Statistics by School Type
PUBLIC CEC PUBLIC CEC
Male=1 0.46 0.46  0.46 0.46  
Age in Years 17.08 16.99 ** 17.11 16.97 ***
(1.30) (1.75) (1.40) (1.79)
Number Household Members 5.16 5.32 *** 5.28 5.40 **
(2.05) (2.06) (2.04) (2.10)
Number of Rooms 4.24 4.32 * 4.23 4.36 **
(1.87) (1.77) (1.86) (1.83)
No Younger Siblings=1 0.34 0.27 *** 0.32 0.26 ***
Dad is Literate 0.98 0.98  0.98 0.98  
Mom is Literate 0.99 0.99  0.98 0.99  
Father Education
Primary 0.39 0.43 *** 0.48 0.44 ***
Secondary 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.48 ***
Associate 0.08 0.07  0.05 0.06  
College or More 0.06 0.04 *** 0.03 0.02  
Mother Education
Primary 0.33 0.38 *** 0.41 0.40  
Secondary 0.51 0.49 *** 0.48 0.50  
Associate 0.11 0.09 *** 0.08 0.08  
College or More 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.03  
Household Income
1 MW or less 0.14 0.13  0.17 0.13 ***
1 < MW < 2 0.53 0.59 *** 0.57 0.60 ***
2 < MW < 3 0.23 0.23  0.20 0.23 **
MW > 4 0.09 0.05 *** 0.05 0.03
Household Stratum
One 0.15 0.24 *** 0.23 0.26 ***
Two 0.51 0.70 *** 0.66 0.71 ***
Three 0.32 0.05 *** 0.10 0.03 ***
Four+ 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00
Floor Quality of Dwelling
Low 0.09 0.05 *** 0.08 0.04 ***
Medium 0.34 0.43 *** 0.45 0.43 **
High 0.57 0.53 *** 0.47 0.53 ***
Assets
Computer at Home 0.49 0.47 *** 0.42 0.45 ***
DVD at Home 0.75 0.75  0.75 0.75  
Car Ownership 0.15 0.16  0.12 0.13 *
Motorbike Ownership 0.07 0.10 *** 0.07 0.08  
No Cellphone in Household 0.06 0.04 *** 0.06 0.04 ***
One Cellphone in Household 0.22 0.21  0.23 0.19 ***
Internet at Home 0.23 0.19 *** 0.17 0.17  
TV Service 0.61 0.56 *** 0.57 0.56  
Outcomes
Math Test Score (SD) 0.00 0.10 *** -0.05 0.10 ***
(1.00) (0.94) (0.97) (0.94)
Verbal Test Score (SD) 0.00 0.08 *** -0.07 0.09 ***
(1.01) (0.89) (0.97) (0.88)
Overall Test Score (SD) -0.33 -0.27 *** -0.39 -0.26 ***
(0.75) (0.64) (0.71) (0.63)
Distance
Relative Distance (meters) 1800 468 *** 546 10 ***
(1774) (1385) (564) (522)
Distance to Actual School (meters) 2856 3244 *** 1803 1883  
(3920) (5712) (2662) (4901)
Number of Schools 410 205
N 31783 10664
A. Full Sample B. UPZ Sample 
25 25
1630 1304
Notes: Panel A includes all observations with valid non-missing data used later in estimation. Panel B includes all
students whose residence is within the same UPZ of a CEC school. The stratum variables is an index running from 1
to 6 which summarizes the socio-economic status of the dwelling and its neighborhood, 1 being the lowest. Household
income is measured in number of monthly minimum wages (MW). Relative Distance is defined as distance to the closest
CEC school minus distance to the closest TPS. Significance levels for the equality of means tests: *** 1%, **5%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Student and Family Characteristics
Male 0.46 -0.003 0.006 0.47 -0.009 0.004
Age 17.07 0.038 0.023 17.09 0.014 0.014
Number Household Members 5.17 0.012 -0.032 5.31 -0.114 -0.075
Father Education: Primary = 1 0.38 0.107*** 0.016 0.47 0.034 0.006
Father Education: Secondary = 1 0.48 -0.048** -0.009 0.45 -0.019 0.000
Mother Education: Primary = 1 0.32 0.077*** -0.002 0.40 0.020 -0.007
Mother Education: Secondary = 1 0.52 -0.026 0.014 0.48 -0.004 0.019
Dad is Literate 0.98 -0.003 0.004 0.98 0.000 0.004
Mom is Literate 0.99 -0.005 0.002 0.98 -0.002 0.003
No Younger Siblings 0.34 -0.038*** -0.023* 0.32 -0.022 -0.026*
Household Income
Stratum 1 = 1 0.15 0.050 -0.010 0.24 -0.001 -0.018
Stratum 2 = 1 0.50 0.214** 0.025 0.65 0.061 0.040*
Stratum 3 = 1 0.34 -0.253*** -0.014 0.11 -0.060 -0.021
House Floors - Low Quality 0.09 -0.031** -0.000 0.08 -0.018 0.006
House Floors - Med Quality 0.34 0.111*** 0.005 0.44 0.021 -0.011
Number of Rooms in Household 4.24 0.016 -0.008 4.24 0.011 -0.017
House Income: 1 MW or less 0.14 0.014 0.004 0.16 -0.000 0.006
House Income: 1 < MW < 2 0.53 0.034** -0.006 0.58 -0.005 -0.015
House Income: 2 < MW < 3 0.23 -0.008 0.003 0.20 0.011 0.008
Household Assets
Computer at Home 0.50 -0.065** -0.007 0.43 -0.014 -0.005
DVD at Home 0.75 -0.014 -0.004 0.75 -0.008 0.001
Car Ownership 0.16 -0.031** -0.003 0.12 -0.000 -0.002
Motorbike Ownership 0.07 0.002 0.001 0.08 -0.003 -0.002
No Cellphone in Household 0.06 -0.001 0.005 0.06 -0.007 0.008
One Cellphone in Household 0.22 0.005 0.007 0.22 0.001 0.002
Internet at Home 0.24 -0.053** 0.011 0.17 0.003 0.020
Cable TV at Home 0.61 -0.058* -0.018 0.58 -0.043 -0.030
N 29971 33413 33413 9373 11968 11968
Full Sample UPZ Sample
Balance Regressions Balance Regressions
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) report means of the variable indicated in each row for students living closer to a TPS than to a CEC
school for the full and UPZ samples, respectively. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) report coefficients from regressions of the variable
indicated in each row on an indicator variable equal to one if the student leaves closer to a CEC school than to a TPS (i.e., the
relative distance instrument). Columns (2) and (5) only include the instrument as a regressor. Columns (3) and (6) include also
UPZ fixed effects. Significance Levels *** 1%, **5%, *10%. All standard errors account for clustering at the UPZ level.
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Tab. 2.4.First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
{Relative Distance < 0m} = 1 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)   
Exogenous Covariates No No Yes No No Yes
UPZ Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Correct Prediction Rate 0.890 0.753 0.717 0.789 0.746 0.759
F-Statistic 42.92 27.64 27.83 52.43 46.81 47.77
N 33413 33413 33413 11968 11968 119968
A. Full Sample B. UPZ Sample 
Dependent: 1{CEC Student =1}
Notes: Panel A includes observations from the full sample. Panel B includes students only from the UPZ sample; that is,
those whose residence is located in UPZ nearby CEC schools. Relative distance is defined as distance to the closest CEC
school minus distance to the closest TPS. The excluded instrument for CEC attendance is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
relative distance is less than or equal to zero. The exogenous covariates are described in Table 2.2. Significance Levels: ***
1%, **5%, *10%. 5000-repetition, paired bootstrap standard errors sampled at the cluster level in parentheses.
Tab. 2.5.OLS and 2SLS Results of CEC Attendance on ICFES Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.120*** 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.134***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
2SLS 0.044 0.525*** 0.559*** 0.309*** 0.600*** 0.609***
(0.119) (0.191) (0.201)   (0.096) (0.134) (0.133)   
p-value Hausman 0.63 0.05 0.03   0.11 0.00 0.00
OLS 0.088** 0.145*** 0.131*** 0.162*** 0.179*** 0.159***
(0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
2SLS -0.089 0.156 0.208   0.195 0.239 0.260
(0.145) (0.202) (0.213)   (0.146) (0.168) (0.169)
p-value Hausman 0.22 0.96 0.71   0.82 0.72 0.54
OLS 0.066** 0.113*** 0.098*** 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.114***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
2SLS -0.060 0.307** 0.347** 0.206* 0.333*** 0.343***
(0.122) (0.151) (0.162)   (0.107) (0.110) (0.109)   
p-value Hausman 0.30 0.17 0.10   0.42 0.05 0.03   
Covariates No No Yes No No Yes
UPZ FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 33413 11968
Panel A.   Full Sample Panel B.   UPZ Sample
 Math Test Score in Standard Deviations
 Verbal Test Score in Standard Deviations
 Overall Test Score in Standard Deviations
Notes: See notes to Table 2.4 for details on samples and exogenous covariates. Relative distance
is defined as distance to the closest CEC school minus distance to the closest TPS. The excluded
instrument for CEC attendance is an indicator variable equal to 1 if relative distance is less than
or equal to zero. 5000-repetition, paired bootstrap standard errors sampled at the cluster level in
parentheses. Significance Levels: *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Tab. 2.6.Placebo Test: Reduced Form Effects of Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICFES 2000 -0.064*** -0.032* -0.026 -0.018 -0.017 -0.040   
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.046)   
ICFES 2008 0.007 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.085*** 0.086***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)   
ICFES 2000 -0.097*** -0.051*** -0.025* -0.020 -0.034 -0.029   
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034)   
ICFES 2008 -0.015 0.016 0.021 0.039 0.034 0.037   
(0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024)   
ICFES 2000 -0.136*** -0.084*** -0.050** -0.021 -0.047 -0.049   
(0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.050) (0.054) (0.048)   
ICFES 2008 -0.010 0.031** 0.035** 0.041** 0.047*** 0.049***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014)   
Covariates No No Yes No No Yes
UPZ FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N  ICFES 2000
N ICFES 2008
 Overall Test Score in Standard Deviations
20533 3776
33413 11968
Panel A.   Full Sample Panel B.   UPZ Sample
 Math Test Score in Standard Deviations
 Verbal Test Score in Standard Deviations
Notes: This table shows reduced form effects of distance to math, verbal, and composite test scores using
2000 and 2008 ICFES data. The year 2000 is one year before the first CEC schools graduated their first
high school class. The instrument for both years is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student lives
relatively closer to a CEC school than to a TPS. For the year 2000, the instrument is constructed as the
distance to the closest not-yet-available CEC school minus the distance to the closest TPS.
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Tab. 2.7.Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
5.62 5.25 5.03 4.74
0.75 0.50 0.25 0.04
0.65 0.42 0.19 0.04
0.33 0.15 0.08 0.03
0.30 0.16 0.08 0.02
0.08 0.17 0.26 0.44
0.86 0.37 0.10 0.02
0.19 0.37 0.55 0.87
0.05 0.09 0.16 0.33
0.03 0.10 0.21 0.61
3.91 4.12 4.34 4.64
8706 8428 8248 8031






1 0.260 0.077 0.075 0.247 0.605 0.216 0.398
(0.020) (0.299) (0.270) (0.218)
2 0.252 0.065 0.124 0.334 0.563 0.170 0.375
(0.026) (0.185) (0.198) (0.160)
3 0.247 0.055 0.108 0.243 0.396 0.012 0.094
(0.025) (0.223) (0.261) (0.172)
4 0.240 0.042 0.106 0.176 0.693 0.549 0.557
(0.022) (0.267) (0.272) (0.235)
Internet at Home = 1
Rooms in dwelling
N
Panel B. Decomposition of IV Weighting by SES Index
No. Household Members
Father Education: Primary = 1
Mother Education: Primary = 1
Stratum 1 = 1
House Income: 1 MW or less
House Income: 2 < MW < 3
Quality Floor Materials: Medium=1
Computer at Home = 1
Car at Home
Panel A. Socio-Economic Characteristics by SES Index
SES Index Quartiles
Notes: This table decomposes IV CEC school attendance estimates by quartiles of a
constructed socio-economic index. Index reflects the predicted probability of being
a SISBEN 1 household using demographic characteristics used in estimation for the
sample living closer to a TPS than to a CEC school. The SISBEN is a government
poverty-targeting index that takes on 6 values, where only levels 1 and 2 are eligible
for most government subsidies. Wq = P(Quartile = q) is the proportion of sample
observations in quartile q = {1, 2, 3, 4}. λq|x = E[P(Z|X, Q)(1− P(Z|X, Q))|Q] is
the expected conditional variance of Z for each quartile, where Z is the categorical
relative distance instrument. ∆Dq|x = E[E(D|Z = 1, X, Q)− E(D|Z = 0, X, Q)|Q] is
the average effect of the instrument on CEC attendance for a given quartile. ωq|x =
(Wqλq|x∆Dq|x)/(∑q Wqλq|x∆Dq|x) is the final weight received by quartile q.
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Tab. 2.8.School Inputs
Public CEC Public CEC Public CEC
Teachers' Education
Less than College 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.07
Major in Education 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.76 0.41 0.74
Other Major 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03
Graduate in Education 0.37 0.15 0.43 0.11 0.45 0.15
Other Graduate 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Student-Teacher Ratio 40.37 38.09 31.3 31.72 30.26 20.87
(24.5) (6.37) (11.74) (8.6) (27.23) (5.95)
Cost Per Student Ratio
Public / CEC 1.11
Primary School Middle School High School
2001 2002 2003
1.01 0.99
Notes: Author’s Calculations from School Survey C-600 for the year 2008 for teachers education and
student-teacher ratios. Source for cost per student is Contraloría Distrital, 2003.
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Appendix A. Figures
Fig. 2.4.UPZs with CEC Schools
Notes: This figure shows the 120 UPZs in Bogotá. UPZs are administrative subdivisions of the city used for urban planning



































































300-Meter Relative Distance Intervals
Proportion of CEC Students within RD Interval
Proportion of Total Students
Graph 1. Proportion of Students by Intervals of Relative Distance (RD)Fig. 2.5.Non-linearity of RD on CEC Attendance Probability
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of total students attending a CEC school who live within a 300-meter interval of relative
















































300-Meter Actual Distance Intervals
CEC Students
Public Students
CEC + Public CDF (Right Scale)
Graph 1. Proportion of Students by Intervals of Actual DistanceFig. 2.6.Proportion of Students by Intervals of Actual Distance
Notes: This figure shows empirical distributions of distance in meters to actual school attended for both CEC and TPS
students. The gray dashed line depicts the joint empirical cumulative distribution for CEC and TPS students, measured in
the right scale. Approximately 15% of all students in the sample live within 300 meters (0.18 miles) from the school they
attend. 73% of all students in the sample live 2000 meters (1.24 miles) or less (right scale) from the school they actually
attend.
Fig. 2.7.Location of Public and CEC Students’ Residence
Notes: This figure shows the location of all public and CEC schools in the city as well as the students residences by type of
school attended. CEC and TPS students’ residences are depicted with dark and light gray dots, respectively. CEC and TPS


















1 2 3 4 5
School ID
Commuting Time to School
0-10 Min 11-20 Min 21-30 Min
Fig. 2.8.Commuting Patterns of 5 CEC Schools











































































300-meter Relative Distance Intervals
2000
2008
Graph 1. Proportion of Students by Intervals of Relative DistanceFig. 2.9.Distribution of Rela ive Dis ance in 2000 and 2008
Notes: This figure describes the empirical distributions of relative distance for the years 2000 and 2008. The year 2000 is one
year before the first CEC schools graduated their first high school class. For the year 2000, relative distance is constructed as
the distance to the closest not-yet-available CEC school minus the distance to the closest TPS.
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Appendix B. Full Set of Estimation Results
Tab. 2.9.First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
{Relative Distance < 0m} = 1 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)   
Male=1 0.00 0.00   
Age -0.00* -0.01   
No. Household Members 0.00 0.00   
Father Education: Primary = 1 -0.02** -0.03*  
Father Education: Secondary = 1 -0.00 -0.00   
Father Education: Associate = 1 0.00 0.02   
Mother Education: Primary = 1 -0.01 -0.01   
Mother Education: Secondary = 1 -0.01 -0.01   
Mother Education: Associate = 1 -0.01 -0.01   
Stratum 1 = 1 0.01 0.09*  
Stratum 2 = 1 0.01 0.08*  
Stratum 3 = 1 -0.02 0.04   
House Income: 1 MW or less 0.01 0.03   
House Income: 1 < MW < 2 0.01** 0.05** 
House Income: 2 < MW < 3 0.01** 0.04***
Dad is Literate -0.00 -0.01   
Mom is Literate 0.02* 0.03*  
House Floors - Low Quality -0.02*** -0.04***
House Floors - Med Quality -0.01 -0.02** 
Computer at Home 0.00 0.00   
DVD at Home -0.00 -0.01   
Car Ownership 0.01 0.01   
Motorbike Ownership 0.01 0.01   
No Cellphone in Household -0.01* -0.02   
One Cellphone in Household -0.00 -0.02   
Internet at Home 0.00 0.00   
Cable TV at Home -0.01* -0.01   
Number of Rooms in Household -0.00 0.00   
UPZ Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adj R-Squared 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.1 0.11
Correct Prediction Rate 0.890 0.753 0.713 0.789 0.746 0.762
F-Statistic 42.92 27.64 27.92 52.43 46.81 47.27
N 33413 33413 33413 11968 11968 119968
Dependent: 1{CEC Student =1}
A. Full Sample B. UPZ Sample 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.4 for details on samples and exogenous covariates. Significance Levels: *** 1%,
**5%, *10%.
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Tab. 2.10.Full Set of 2SLS Results
Math Verbal Overall Math Verbal Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEC School = 1 0.553*** 0.198   0.338** 0.610*** 0.256   0.337***
Male=1 0.296*** -0.007   0.135*** 0.293*** -0.028** 0.127***
Age -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.064***
No. Household Members -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.012** -0.018*** -0.016***
Father Education: Primary = 1 -0.124*** -0.205*** -0.175*** -0.103** -0.139*** -0.144***
Father Education: Secondary = 1 -0.109*** -0.164*** -0.145*** -0.068   -0.081*  -0.096** 
Father Education: Associate = 1 0.025   -0.024   -0.003   0.085   0.047   0.037   
Mother Education: Primary = 1 -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.088   -0.127** -0.112** 
Mother Education: Secondary = 1 -0.075*** -0.094*** -0.084*** -0.054   -0.110** -0.083** 
Mother Education: Associate = 1 0.023   0.019   0.005   0.013   0.024   0.005   
Stratum 1 = 1 -0.107*  -0.104*  -0.122** 0.100   0.110   0.119   
Stratum 2 = 1 -0.083   -0.042   -0.065   0.133   0.176   0.187   
Stratum 3 = 1 -0.014   0.028   0.001   0.174   0.269   0.251   
House Income: 1 MW or less -0.199*** -0.194*** -0.184*** -0.212*** -0.193*** -0.180***
House Income: 1 < MW < 2 -0.099*** -0.121*** -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.135*** -0.096***
House Income: 2 < MW < 3 -0.061*** -0.051** -0.047*** -0.083** -0.081** -0.047*  
Dad is Literate 0.054   0.038   0.041   -0.001   -0.020   -0.027   
Mom is Literate 0.083*  0.084*  0.106*** 0.013   0.051   0.069*  
House Floors - Low Quality -0.007   -0.047** -0.012   -0.019   -0.097*** -0.039   
House Floors - Med Quality -0.002   -0.013   -0.004   0.037*  0.008   0.021   
Computer at Home 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.097*** 0.080*** 0.088***
DVD at Home -0.039*** -0.028*  -0.031*** -0.037** -0.034   -0.029   
Car Ownership -0.020   -0.032** -0.029** 0.000   -0.054** -0.040***
Motorbike Ownership -0.098*** -0.068*** -0.096*** -0.057** -0.046   -0.068***
No Cellphone in Household -0.019   -0.040   -0.032   -0.034   -0.050   -0.045   
One Cellphone in Household -0.047*** -0.023*  -0.031*** -0.045*  -0.030   -0.037** 
Internet at Home 0.005   0.011   0.010   -0.017   0.007   0.003   
Cable TV at Home -0.044*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.044** -0.053*** -0.056***
Number of Rooms in Household 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*  0.012*** 0.010***
UPZ Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N
Dependent:                                            
Test Score in SD
A. Full Sample B. UPZ Sample
33413 11968
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5 for details on samples and exogenous covariates. Significance Levels: *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Appendix C. Calculating Relative Distance to Closest CEC School
This appendix describes the methodology used to construct the relative
distance instrument used in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. As indicated
above, the proposed instrument requires finding the closest CEC and the closest
TPS for each student in the sample, regardless of the actual school they attended.
For this, two data sources are used. First, I use administrative data on students’
residential addresses collected by ICFES at the time of test registration. With
these addresses available, the idea is to obtain geographic information —that
is, a latitude and a longitude— for each one of these addresses. To do so, I
use administrative data from UACD, a local government organization in Bogota
responsible for keeping a comprehensive register of the metes-and-bounds of
all real property of the city. This dataset includes details of ownership, tenure,
precise location (GPS coordinates), area, value, and UPZ location.
For these two datasets to be successfully merged by address, both ICFES
and UACD addresses may be written in a standardized form. While the ad-
dresses in the cadastral dataset are properly written (in fact, UACD is respon-
sible for assigning legal address to properties), students —and city residents in
general— usually use several ways of writing them. As a result, approximately
15% of students’ addresses can be merged using the data reported by students.
Fortunately, addresses in Bogota have a rather specific alpha-numeric structure
that can be used to infer the proper address reported to ICFES by students.
The general address structure in Bogota can be best described by a numer-
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ical cartesian plane where streets increase in number as they move away from
the center. In principle, streets that run from east to west are known as calles and
streets that run from north to south are known as carreras. Nevertheless, as the
city is far from being a simple raster, some streets are also referred as Avenida,
Diagonal, or Transversal. A common address in Bogota starts with the name of
the street type (i.e., calle, carrera, avenida, diagonal, transveral) where the property
is located. After the street type, most addresses have next a number with at most
3 digits which may be followed by a single letter in the set [A-D,F-M,O-R,T-Z]
as well as by the word BIS, which may also have a letter on its own too. Then,
addresses located in the south part of the city have the word SUR and addresses
un the east part of the city the word ESTE. Addresses located in the north or
west sections of the city do not have anything. After this part of the address is
written, another at-most 3-digit number must follow with the possibility of hav-
ing another single letter in the set [A-D,F-M,O-R,T-Z] as well as by the word BIS.
Then a final at-most 3-digit number follows. At this point there may also be ad-
dresses with either the word SUR or the word ESTE. After this point, properties
that are apartments or houses within a residential complex may have additional
information such as the apartment number.
To make things clear, an example of an address in Bogota can be: KR 5A
SUR 24B 58 . An address like that, for example, is located on carrera 5A in the
south-west quadrant of the city, 58 meters away from the intersection of the 5A
carrera and the 24B calle. Note that the letters that follow the streets indicate
that there are many streets with the same number and the letters are used to
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distinguish between them. For example, a property on the calle 5B is located in
between calle 5A and calle 5C (or calle 6 in case there is no 5C).
Taking advantage of this common structure, I wrote a stata program that
makes extensive use of regular expressions in order to rewrite all student ad-
dresses in the UACD format to maximize the number of merged addresses. The
main reasons why addresses do not exactly match between these two datasets is
because students include either more information than needed (e.g., variations
of the word número to separate numerical parts within the address, or the name
if the neighborhood), or because spaces between numbers and letters do not
precisely coincide (KR 5 A as opposed to KR 5A). The written program allows
me to assign geographic coordinates (e.g., latitude and longitude) to 81% and
85% of the students’ residences for the years 2007 and 2008, respectively. As
shown in Table 2.11, there are no significant differences in the SES characteris-
tics of the matched and unmatched samples for the year 2008, suggesting, for
example, that students with lower SES are not more likely to misreport their
home address. Unfortunately, this analysis can only be conducted for a subset
of the SES variables in 2007 since most of the SES variables were not collected
in this year. Nevertheless, the results for 2007 also show that there are no signif-
icant differences in students’ age and gender between matched and unmatched
samples.
Once I am able to geo-reference student residences, I proceed to calculate
the linear (i.e., euclidean) distance from each student’s home to all TPS and CEC
schools in Bogota. To do this, I use the Hawths tool in ARC-GIS to calculate
81
the distance between all the points of two datasets, the ICFES and the UACD
address files. Then, for each student I find what is the closest CEC school as
well as the closest TPS. Finally, I use these two measures to calculate the relative
distance to the closest CEC school as the difference between the distance to the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. LONGER-RUN EFFECTS OF THE CEC PROGRAM
3.1. Introduction
The question of whether private schools provide better education than pub-
lic schools has been a long and much debated issue. This question, for exam-
ple, is at the center of the debate over the effects on academic performance of
programs such as vouchers, charter schools, or education management orga-
nizations. Unlike voucher programs —where the control over the quality of
education provided by participating schools is mostly left to private users—
other programs have been designed so that the state retains a fair measure of
control over service delivery by monitoring performance, imposing penalties or
by replacing providers in case of performance failure. To some extent, charter
schools in the Unites States and in Alberta (Canada), Academies in England,
Free schools in Sweden, and CEC schools in Bogota (Colombia) are good exam-
ples of this second provision type. In general, these initiatives aim at broadening
the decision-making autonomy of schools and promoting accountability, while
remaining under —admittedly varying levels of— public control.
Previous research on the effects of this second provision type focuses mostly
on the short-run effects of attending privately run public schools on test scores,
with most of the existing evidence coming from evaluating US charter schools
with rather mixed results (Angrist et. al [2010]; Abdulkadiroglu et. al, [2009];
Dobbie and Fryer, [2009]; Hoxby and Murarka, [2009]; Hoxby and Rockoff,
[2004]; Saas, [2006]; Bifulco and Ladd, [2004]; Hanushek et. al, [2007]; Booker
et. al [2007]). Nevertheless, missing from these studies is an assessment of
longer-run outcomes of attending such schools, such as earnings and college
enrollment, outcomes that are more clearly tied to economic success.
While generating higher earnings capacity is one of the most important
goals of education, using earnings as an outcome to evaluate school quality is
empirically difficult for a variety of reasons, including the fact that actual earn-
ings do not show up until many years after individuals have finished their sec-
ondary education. As a result, standardized tests have been used as proxies for
school quality, even though the existing evidence of the relationship between test
scores and earnings is not conclusive. While some have argued in favor of a pos-
itive relationship between test scores and individual earnings and productivity
(e.g., Hanushek, [2006]; Lazear, [2003]), others have asserted that standardized
tests can only partially measure a student’s ability and cannot measure students’
deeper problem-solving skills (Card and Krueger, [1992]; Evans and Schwab,
[1995]). Consequently, these authors have stressed the importance of looking at
alternative measures of educational attainment such as completing high school
or going on to college to evaluate school performance. Looking at college en-
trance is an important outcome because of the large pecuniary gains derived
from higher education and its potential effects on reducing income inequality.
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This chapter examines the longer-run effects of attending contracted-out
public schools using data from Bogota’s CEC school program, previously dis-
cussed in chapters 1 and 2. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first
attempt to look at the causal relationship between contracted out public schools
and higher education outcomes.
In chapter 2, I looked at the effects on ICFES test scores, a high-stakes
standardized test taken by the vast majority of students in their last year of high
school. In 2008, for example, 93% of TPS and 96% of CEC students, respectively,
took the test. Taking the test is a compulsory requirement for students intending
to enroll in college in Colombia and serves as the primary college admission
criterion (ICFES, 1999). Therefore, it seems natural to ask whether CEC students
have been able to translate higher ICFES test scores, for example, into higher
college enrollment rates relative to Traditional Public School (TPS) students. The
latter outcome is a relevant long term measure of school performance given that
the returns to college in Colombia have been estimated to be twice as large as
the returns to secondary schooling (World Bank, 2003).
In addition to this outcome, I also consider whether students who attended
CEC schools are more likely to be admitted at selective universities, as there is
causal evidence for Colombia showing that students who attend selective uni-
versities are more likely to have formal employment and have higher earnings
than students attending non-selective institutions (Saavedra, [2008]). However,
low-fee charging, selective, public universities in Colombia have managed to
keep the number of admitted students low (World Bank, 2003). As a result, low-
86
income students who traditionally graduate from TPS and CEC schools may
find it difficult to compete with private school students for admission into se-
lective, public institutions. Consequently, some public schools may be aiming to
place their students in two-year vocational programs, specifically designed to in-
crease students’ odds of getting formal employment. In fact, some CEC schools
have developed terminal vocational courses in order to smooth out their stu-
dents’ entrance to vocational programs at higher education institutions. Thus,
as a third outcome, I look at the probability of enrolling in 2-year technical and
technological programs relative to TPS students.
Finally, I look at the college dropout behavior of CEC students. In Colom-
bia, about 50% of the students that enroll in higher education institutions drop
out from their programs (MEN, 2010). While part of this may be due to financial
considerations, including inadequate student financial aid for low-income stu-
dents, it is often argued that the low-quality of secondary education is also an
important reason for dropping out of college.
To construct these higher education outcomes, I use administrative data
from the Ministry of Education on college enrollment which has student-level
information on institution and program enrollment as well as dropout informa-
tion. Given that students who attend CEC schools may differ in unobservable
ways from public school students, I obtain causal estimates of CEC attendance
by exploiting variation in distance from a student’s residence to the closest CEC
institution to construct an instrument for CEC attendance. In chapter 2, I care-
fully argued that this instrument is conditionally uncorrelated with unobserved
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determinants of academic achievement.
OLS and 2SLS estimates indicate that, relative to TPS students, CEC stu-
dents are substantially more likely to enroll in college in general and to enroll in
two-year vocational programs in particular. Moreover, while CEC students score
significantly higher in the ICFES test than TPS students, these higher scores do
not seem to be sufficiently larger to effectively compete for admission at se-
lective, public institutions in Bogota. I also provide some evidence that CEC
students are not more likely to drop out from college relative to TPS students.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides
background information on the CEC program and on the higher education sec-
tor in Colombia. Section 3.3 describes the sample and the construction of the
higher education outcomes. Section 3.4 presents the empirical strategy. Section
3.5 provides the OLS and IV results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Background
The demand for secondary education increased dramatically in the last
two decades in Colombia. In 2002, there were 1.6 millon 15- and 16-year-olds
in the country, of whom 57% were attending a high school institution. By 2010,
this gross enrollment rate reached 79%, even though the population in that age
bracket also grew by 8 percent during that period (MEN, 2010). As a result,
the number of high school graduates increased by 67% between 2002 and 2009.
Interestingly, most of the increase in high school enrollment was primarily ab-
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sorbed by the public education system, with 81% of the high school students
attending public schools, up from 70% a decade earlier.
What these figures suggest is that both local and national education author-
ities in Colombia have implemented policies to meet the increasing demand for
public education. However, local governments have also been exploring policies
aimed at improving the quality of public education. Colombia has consistently
performed below average in international standardized tests relative to countries
with similar levels of income. Indeed, country average results on the 2006 PISA
test for reading, mathematics and science are slightly below the Latin American
average and much lower relative to other emerging OECD countries. Alternative
international evaluations such as TIMSS 1995, TIMSS 2006, and Pisa 2009 show
similar results.
Some of the implemented policies to either increase enrollment or improve
quality involved the participation of the private sector in the provision of public
education. The PACES program, for example, during the 1990s in Colombia is
known for being one of the largest voucher school programs to have ever been
implemented (Angrist, 2002). That program was an effort to increase secondary
enrollment rates among low income families. In addition to PACES, the local
government of Bogota implemented in 1999 the Colegios en Concesión (CEC) Pro-
gram, a large-scale initiative, which contracted out the administration of all the
new public schools constructed in the city in the period 2000-2003.
As discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2, the CEC program allowed con-
tracted out schools to operate outside teacher collective bargaining provisions
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in return for increased school accountability, including test-based accountability.
More specifically, the program made CEC schools subject to an annual evalua-
tion based on a series of factors related to education quality including, for exam-
ple, teachers’ education and experience and student dropout and transfer rates.
Also, CEC schools failing to meet academic standards based on the school’s
average score on the overall ICFES test may be subject to contract rescission.
Instrumental variable results in Chapter 2 show that CEC students’ ICFES
scores in 2008 are approximately 0.6 and 0.25 standard deviations higher in
math and verbal test scores, respectively, relative to TPS students. Moreover, the
results on ICFES composite test score1 indicate that attending a CEC school in-
creases composite test scores by 0.3 standard deviations relative to TPS students.
This latter finding is of interest for the present chapter given that the ICFES com-
posite test score is the single most important criterion used by higher education
institutions to determine admission (ICFES, 1999). Then, the idea in this chapter
is to determine to what extent the higher ICFES test scores exhibited by CEC
students have translated into better education outcomes for them relative to TPS
students.
3.2.1. Higher Education in Colombia
In Colombia, the proportion of 18- to 24-year-olds enrolled in college in
2010 reached 37%, which represents a 85% increase relative to the rate in 1999
1 the ICFES test evaluates students on most of the curriculum subjects determined by the
Colombian Ministry of Education, namely, Math, Reading, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, History,
Geography, Philosophy, and English.
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(MEN, 2011) —although, it is still below the Latin American rate which has an
average rate of 44%. Despite these gains in college enrollment in the last decade,
there remains a significant difference between the gross college enrollment rate
of 37% and the high school gross enrollment rate of 79%. However, as is true
almost everywhere, college enrollment in Colombia rises dramatically with in-
come. According to Saavedra (2008), 40% of the 18- to 24-year-olds from the
wealthiest income quintile are enrolled in college, compared to just 6% from the
lowest quintile.
There are 289 colleges and universities in Colombia, 72% of which are
privately owned. About 44% of college students attend private institutions indi-
cating that private institutions serve fewer students on average relative to public
ones. There are four types of tertiary education institutions: universities (27%
of the total number of institutions), university institutions (40%), technological
institutions (18%), and technical training institutions (15%). While the first two
categories serve as teaching and some as research institutions, technical and
technological institutions provide short, non-academic programs that respond
flexibly to labor market demands —similar to two-year colleges in the United
States. Whereas in 2000, 86% of higher education students were enrolled in ei-
ther universities or university institutions (World Bank, 2003), by 2010 65% of
them are. This suggests that most of the large increase in college enrollment in
Colombia in the last decade has been absorbed by technical and technological
institutions (MEN, 2011).
There are 59 selective higher education institutions in Colombia, that is,
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institutions with more applicants than slots. As expected, the most selective
institutions are those with higher expenditures per student and higher fractions
of full time and PhD faculty and admit students with higher ICFES test scores
(Saavedra, 2008).
As noted above, students intending to enroll in college in Colombia must
be high school graduates and must have taken the ICFES test. Moreover, a
high ICFES score almost certainly leads to a place in high-return programs at
selective universities. In fact, of the 59 selective universities in Colombia, 25 use
the ICFES test exclusively to determine admission; the remaining schools use
it in combination with other requisites (Saavedra, 2008). The test is conducted
twice a year, usually in April and September, given that some high schools in
Colombia end their academic year in June while others do so in December. As
a result, higher education institutions also have two different entry periods each
year.
In Colombia, the private returns to each year of tertiary education reached
22% in 2001. Moreover, workers with tertiary education earn 275% more than
average worker and more than 6.5 times the wage of a worker with no education
(World Bank, 2003). In comparison, college graduates in the US earned 55%
more on average than high school graduates in 2009 (Becker et al, 2010).
The joint existence of high returns to higher education and low enrollment
rates suggests there may be some systematic barriers that prevent students from
investing in higher education. Although a comprehensive characterization of
this phenomenon is outside the scope of the present study, some studies have
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argued that the low and unequal access to higher education in Colombia is partly
originated in the basic education system (Bloom and Hansen, 2003). That is, the
low quality primary and secondary education may prevent students from being
admitted at selective, high returns college and majors, leaving low-quality, low-
return institutions as their only choice. Indeed, whereas inexpensive, selective,
public institutions have been in strong demand in the last two decades, private,
non-selective institutions have faced oversupply (World Bank, 2003).
In addition, there is also evidence suggesting that the probability of drop-
ping out of college in Colombia is highly correlated with poor academic back-
ground. First, only 14% of college dropouts passed all attempted credits in the
period 1998-2005. Second, the largest college dropout rates occur in the first two
semesters of college. Indeed, out of 100 students enrolled in higher education,
25 dropped out at the end of the first semester —by far the largest dropout rate
for a given semester. This may be a sign that students enrolling in college have
not been sufficiently prepared. Third, the highest dropout rates occur among
those with the lowest composite ICFES scores as well as those enrolled in ma-
jors with higher requirements for high-school background such as engineering
(MEN, 2006).
Consequently, improvements in the quality of education received by low-
income households at public schools should not only increase their odds of at-
tending more selective institutions, but also the likelihood of staying enrolled
while in college.
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3.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used for this chapter are derived from three sources. First, I
use administrative data from ICFES, which contains student level information
on TPS and CEC students who took the test in the second semesters of 2007
and 2008. For both of these years, I have individual scores for each one of the
nine sections of the test, the student’s high school, age, gender, and residential
address. For the year 2008, I also have information on students’ parental edu-
cation, residence stratum,2 household income, number of household members,
and asset ownership (e.g., car, computer, cell phone, TV, etc.).
The second source of data uses Bogota’s cadastral database, a comprehen-
sive register of all the real properties in the city. This dataset —which includes
details of ownership, tenure, location (GPS coordinates), area, value, and UPZ
location of all properties— allows me to assign geographic coordinates (i.e., lat-
itude and longitude) to 81% and 85% of the students’ residences for the years
2007 and 2008, respectively. By geo-referencing students residences, I am able
to calculate the distance from a student’s home to both actual and potential TPS
and CEC schools in Bogota. As shown in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2, there are
no economically significant differences in the SES characteristics of the matched
and unmatched samples for the year 2008, suggesting, for example, that students
2 The stratum is a six-level classification used by the local government to characterize the
socio-economic characteristics of a given dwelling. The higher the stratum is, the better the
socioeconomic status of the dwelling. In general, residents of dwellings in the first 2 strata are
considered the urban poor and pay, for example, subsidized prices for public utilities such as
water and electricity.
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with lower SES are not more likely to misreport their home address. Unfortu-
nately, this analysis can only be conducted for a subset of the SES variables in
2007 since most of the SES variables were not collected in this year. Neverthe-
less, the results for 2007 also show that there are no significant differences in
students’ age and gender between matched and unmatched samples.
The last data source uses information from SPADIES 2010, an administra-
tive dataset from the Ministry of Education of Colombia that contains individual
level information on college enrollment such as institution attended, major, date
of first entry into higher education, and date of last semester the student is ob-
served enrolled.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for CEC and TPS students by year
of high school graduation and college enrollment status. Some of these statistics
are worth discussing. First, students enrolled in college have higher ICFES test
scores than students who did not enroll. For example, for both 2007 and 2008
and both school types (i.e., TPS and CEC), students attending a college insti-
tution score 0.3 standard deviations higher in Math relative to students not in
college. Second, as shown in columns 7 to 10, relative to non-college students,
college students are younger, come from smaller families, have more educated
parents, have a higher family income, and live in better neighborhoods as indi-
cated by the stratum of the dwelling. In general, these figures provide evidence
that college enrollment in Bogota is positively correlated with family income.
Third, 34% of TPS students and 35% of CEC students are enrolled in higher
education in 2007. It is rather surprising, however, that only 18% of TPS and CEC
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students were pursuing a college degree in 2008. It is not clear what the reason is
for this lower college enrollment rate in 2008. Although the 2007 cohort has had
three years to have enrolled in college by 2011 —relative to two years for the 2008
cohort— data on students’ college entry dates shows this extra year explains
little of the difference in college enrollment rates. That is, the 2007-cohort college
enrollment rate is as high as 31% whenever the students who enrolled in college
in their third year after high school graduation are considered as not enrolled. A
more plausible explanation is that some higher education institutions have not
reported their most recent information on enrollment to SPADIES. In any case,
the striking difference in enrollment for these two cohorts cast some doubts on
the use of the 2008 data on higher education. Consequently, in Section 5, I will
be presenting separate results for 2007 cohort as well as joint results for the 2007
and 2008 cohorts.
Finally, I compare test scores and SES characteristics for TPS and CEC stu-
dents who enrolled in college and whose residences are located in UPZs with
nearby CEC schools (henceforth, the UPZ sample). UPZs are subdivisions of the
city used by the local government for urban planning purposes and are defined
in such a way that the urban and economic characteristics of the real proper-
ties within them are similar. The descriptive statistics in column 12 show that
CEC and TPS students have very similar SES characteristics, although CEC stu-
dents are slightly more likely to live in low-strata neighborhoods. Nevertheless,
CEC students exhibit higher ICFES scores than TPS students of about 0.15 to 0.2
standard deviations.
96
In Table 3.2, I also present descriptive statistics on college outcomes by
high school graduation cohort and school type. Using observations from the
full sample, one can see that higher education outcomes between TPS and CEC
students in the full sample are fairly similar. First, TPS and CEC students have
very similar college enrollment rates. Second, around 30% of both CEC and
TPS students are enrolled at a selective institution.3 Third, they also have very
similar major distributions with 2-year vocational programs (i.e., technical and
technological) being the program most commonly chosen by students. Fourth,
their ICFES composite test scores make them equally eligible for government
sponsored ICETEX loans for higher education studies.4
Fifth, based on students’ ICFES scores and cut-offs used to determine ad-
mission into engineering programs at the Universidad Distrital, I find that at most
6% of TPS and CEC students are eligible for admission into selective, 5-year
engineering programs at this institution. The Universidad Distrital is a low-fee,
selective, public university in Bogota, although it is not the most selective, public
university in the city.5 This shows that low-income students intending to enroll
in selective, public institutions in Bogota face strong competition from private
school students. Finally, CEC and TPS students have similar college dropout
rates with a quarter or more dropping out at the end of their first semester of
3 An institution is considered selective if the ratio of slots over applicants is less than one. I
construct this ratio based on information from ICFES (2002)
4 The ICFES score is just one of the criteria used to grant these loans. Students are also
required to have guarantors with collateral, which in practice may have resulted in low-income
students receiving a relatively low proportion of the granted loans.
5 I use the Universidad Distrital as an example here since —unlike other selective, public insti-
tutions in Bogota— its admission process is only determined by ICFES test scores.
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enrollment and 40% or higher dropping out during their first college year.
While the higher education statistics for the UPZ sample mostly reflect the
patterns of the full sample, two differences are worth noting. First, CEC students
are 9 percentage points more likely to enroll at a college institution in 2007.
Second, CEC students are slightly more likely to be enrolled at a selective, public
university than TPS students.
3.4. Empirical Strategy
I use the same identification strategy in this chapter as in Chapter 2, that
is, an instrumental variables approach that uses distance to closest CEC school
to construct an instrument for CEC attendance. As previously discussed, the
algorithm used in Bogota to allocate students into public schools gives priority
to families with the lowest socioeconomic status (SES) and, as a result, over
subscribed schools could systematically get students with lower than average
SES. On the other hand, students are allowed to apply to any school in the city,
something that can lead to selection of most informed or motivated parents into
better public schools. Whatever the case, an identification strategy must account
for the potential selection of CEC program participants into CEC schools in order
to estimate the causal effect of CEC attendance on higher education outcomes.
A consistent estimate for the effect of CEC attendance on academic per-
formance can be recovered if there is at least one variable Z that, in addition to
being uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of college outcomes, is also a
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strong predictor of the probability of attending a CEC school. I exploit variation
in distance from a student’s residence to the closest CEC institution to construct
an instrument for CEC attendance. More specifically, I first calculate the distance
to the closest CEC school relative to the closest TPS school, mostly to account
for the fact that students who live far from a CEC school may still live even fur-
ther away from a TPS and consequently are more likely to attend a CEC school.
Thus, I define the instrument as a categorical variable taking the value of 1 if a
student lives closer to a CEC school than to a traditional public school (i.e., for
negative relative distances) and 0 otherwise. That is,





where dij is the distance from student’s i residence to school j ∈ [c, p]
The rationale behind the proposed instrument is that differential distances
to CEC schools may induce quasi-experimental differences in transportation and
opportunity costs of attending a given CEC school to students and their par-
ents. These differences may be especially important for low-income students for
whom the decrease in costs due to CEC proximity is what may induce choosing
a CEC school. For the proposed instrument to be valid, it can only affect student
outcomes through its effect on CEC attendance. Since CEC schools were located
in low-income neighborhoods in Bogota, students who live closer to CEC schools
are also more likely to have a lower SES relative to TPS students and, as a result,
distance to CEC schools would also capture their lower socio-economic back-
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ground, violating the exclusion restriction. Indeed, in Table 3.1, columns 8 and
10, the SES characteristics of CEC students who enrolled in college are slightly
lower than those of TPS students. That is, CEC students have less educated par-
ents, come from lower income families, and live in low-strata neighborhoods.
Note also that CEC students have a lower SES than TPS students among those
that did not enroll in college —columns 7 versus 9.
However, the SES characteristics of the 2008 CEC and TPS students who
are enrolled in college and belong to the UPZ sample (columns 11 and 12) are
remarkably similar. Moreover, correlations between each of the SES variables
and the categorical instrument for the 2008 cohort (Table 2.4, chapter 2) suggests
that the instrument is not correlated with SES variables in those specifications
that control for either student UPZ fixed effects or include observations only
from the UPZ sample. I interpret these results as evidence that the proposed
relative distance instrument is exogenous conditional on UPZ fixed effects or
conditional on residing in UPZs with nearby CEC schools (i.e., the UPZ sample).
3.5. Results
This section estimates 2SLS specifications of CEC attendance on higher
education outcomes. To account for the possibility of correlation of student
outcomes within a given neighborhood, all regression estimates are clustered at
the UPZ level for the 2007 cohort and at the UPZ-year level for specifications
with data from both 2007 and 2008 cohorts .
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3.5.1. First Stage Estimates
Table 3.3 shows the estimates of linear probability models for CEC school
attendance on the categorical relative distance instrument and different sets of
exogenous regressors. For the 2007 cohort and using all observations in the
sample, the probability of attending a CEC school is 16 percentage points higher
whenever the closest school available to the student is a CEC school. In turn,
using observations from the UPZ sample increases this probability by 26 per-
centage points.
Notice that whereas the inclusion of UPZ fixed effects slightly reduces the
reported point estimates, controlling for SES student characteristics such as age,
gender, and student’s residential stratum has little effect on the point estimates.
That is, that the coefficient estimates and standard errors show little or no change
across columns indicates there is little correlation between the instrument and
the observable characteristics. This result supports the argument that the pro-
posed instrument may be uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics as well.
First stage estimates obtained from the joint 2007-2008 sample largely repli-
cates the results of the the 2007 cohort. Notice that, whenever this sample is
used, I also include a year fixed effect to account for differences in CEC at-
tendance in time. Finally, note that the F-statistic on the excluded instrument
in all specifications are well above the conventional levels used to assess finite
sample bias from weak instruments and provides evidence on the strong associ-




I now proceed to present ordinary least squares (OLS), reduced form (RF),
and two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of CEC attendance on higher edu-
cation outcomes. In particular, I estimate the effects on ICFES test scores as well
as the effects on the probability of college enrollment, the probability of being
enrolled at a selective public institution, the probability of enrolling in a 2-year
vocational program, and the probability of dropping out during the first year
in college. Notice that in Table 3.4, I restrict the analysis to observations from
the UPZ sample to better control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics.
In addition to this, all specifications include UPZ fixed effects, age, gender, and
student residential stratum as controls. For the joint 2007-2008 cohort specifica-
tions, I also include a 2008 year fixed effect.
In chapter 2, I provide causal evidence that CEC students graduating from
high school in 2008 exhibited large and significant gains in test scores relative
to TPS students. In the top panel of Table 3.4, I estimate the effects of CEC
attendance for those graduating in 2007 as well as for the joint 2007-2008 cohorts.
The point estimates for 2007 indicate that CEC students score 0.13 standard
deviations higher on the ICFES test than TPS students. Similar point estimates
are found for the math and verbal sections of the test. Note that these results
are smaller than the ones found in Chapter 2 for the 2008 cohort and similar
in magnitude to OLS estimates. In fact, the results using both 2007 and 2008
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cohorts show stronger results of ICFES scores in favor of CEC students mostly
because of the large effects of the 2008 cohort. The lower estimates of the 2007
cohort could be a result of a series of factors including CEC schools’ learning
curve. In addition, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2, it was only after 2007
that a standardized and more comprehensive annual evaluation process of CEC
schools’ performance was implemented, including more demanding conditions
in terms of ICFES test results. These evaluations have been conducted yearly
since then to all CEC schools and allow for individual school comparisons over
time.6
Regarding higher education outcomes, I first report the estimates of CEC
attendance on college enrollment. In 2007, CEC students are 12 percentage
points more likely to enroll in college. This represents more than a 50% in-
crease over the average college enrollment of 22% for this sample. For the joint
2007-2008 cohorts, the increase in the probability of college enrollment of CEC
students relative to TPS students is less pronounced, 4.6 percentage points, and
less precisely estimated —although similar in magnitude to the more precise
OLS estimate. In any case, as stated before, it remains to be seen to what extent
this lower estimated effect has been affected by the suspiciously low proportion
of 2008 students found enrolled in higher education as discussed in Section 3.
There is a rather low proportion of students in the sample who are enrolled
at the selective public universities in Bogota, namely, the Universidad Nacional
6 In future work, it will be of interest to determine how more recent cohorts of CEC students
have performed in the ICFES test to further assess the evidence among these two plausible
explanations.
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and the Universidad Distrital. This is not surprising given that these two uni-
versities are the most highly selective, low-fee institutions in the city and, as a
result, public high school students face strong competition from private school
students. In any case, OLS and 2SLS estimates for the 2007 cohort indicate that
CEC students are about 1 percentage point more likely to attend one of these
institutions than TPS students —a relatively large effect compare to an uncondi-
tional mean of 3%.
The low proportion of public high school students enrolled at selective,
public institutions provides suggestive evidence that there is high demand for
public, selective institutions in the city and, unless public school students have
outstanding high ICFES scores relative to all college applicants, the probabil-
ity of being admitted to programs at these institutions is quite low. Figure 3.1
presents some evidence on this point. In particular, it shows kernel distribu-
tions of all ICFES test takers in the second semester of 2008 in Bogota by school
type. First, notice that —despite large heterogeneity in test scores among pri-
vate school students— the test score distribution for private school students is
to the right of CEC and TPS distributions. As a result, private school students
are more likely to be admitted at selective institutions thanks to having higher
ICFES test scores. More importantly, note how similar the unconditional test
score distributions for CEC and TPS are. However, in Chapter 2 I provided ev-
idence that —after accounting for negative selection into the CEC program—
the average CEC student significantly outperforms the average TPS student on
the ICFES test, especially for the 2008 cohort. What these two results indicate
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is that, although CEC schools attendance improve average performance on the
ICFES test, these higher results are not sufficiently large so as to compensate for
the negative selection of CEC participants so that they can compete with private
school students for admission at selective institutions.
Nevertheless, what the results on college enrollment indicate is that CEC
students are significantly more likely to enroll in a college or university than TPS
students, just not at selective institutions. I therefore consider, as a third outcome
for higher education, the probability of attending a two-year vocational program
by CEC students. The results indicate that CEC students are 8.8 and 6.5 percent-
age points more likely to attend a vocational program than TPS students in the
2007 and the 2007-2008 samples, respectively. These results represent more than
an 85% increase when compared to the unconditional means of 2-year programs.
The estimated results for this outcome are of interest because, according to the
Ministry of Education, 74% of the graduates from technological programs in
Colombia have formal employment —just 3 percentage points less than gradu-
ates from 5-year colleges and universities in the 2001-2009 period (MEN, 2011).
Also, graduates from technology programs have earnings equal to 75% of the
earnings of university graduates. Thus, these results suggest that attending a
CEC school has important longer-run effects related to higher education, even
though these effects are not so much obtained via higher ICFES test scores. Fi-
nally, the evidence on the probability of dropping out in the first two semesters
after enrolling in higher education suggests there is no statistically significant
difference in this probability between CEC and TPS students.
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3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I estimate the causal effects of attending contracted out pub-
lic schools on higher education outcomes. The issue of contracting out public
schools has gained attention in the education literature as a potential alternative
for the provision of public education with schools experiencing higher levels
of autonomy while being contractually accountable for their students’ perfor-
mance. Given that the literature has mostly focused on the effects on standard-
ized tests, this study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to look
at the effects of these programs on longer-run outcomes and, in particular, on
tertiary education outcomes.
Given that in Bogota CEC students were not randomly allocated into schools
and CEC schools were not randomly allocated in the city, I use an instrumental
variables strategy that exploits exogenous variation in distance from a student’s
residence to the nearest CEC school. In Chapter 2 and here, I provide evidence
that the location of CEC schools was unrelated to the academic performance of
potential students and that the proposed instrument is likely to be uncorrelated
with unobserved determinants of academic performance.
OLS and 2SLS estimates indicate that CEC students are substantially more
likely to enroll in college in general and to enroll in two-year vocational pro-
grams in particular. Moreover, while CEC students score significantly higher in
the ICFES test —the main criterion used to determine admission into higher ed-
ucation in Colombia— than TPS students, these higher scores do not seem to be
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sufficiently higher to effectively compete for slots at selective, public institutions
in Bogota. I also provide some evidence that CEC students are not more likely
to drop out from college relative to TPS students.
In this study, I provide some evidence on positive longer-run effects of
attending a CEC school, especially the higher college enrollment rate of CEC
students. The evidence also indicates that this higher participation is, to a great
extent, explained by a higher probability of enrolling in 2-year vocational pro-
grams. Estimates by the Ministry of Education suggests that graduates from
vocational programs may enjoy better labor market outcomes in terms of the
probability of being formally employed and earnings. However, admission into
vocational programs imposes lower requirements in terms of ICFES test scores
as admission is not as competitive. Therefore, what these results indicate is that,
even though CEC students outperform TPS in the ICFES test, their higher college
enrollment rates are not explained by their higher ICFES scores. This is consis-
tent with the intention of some CEC schools of providing terminal vocational
courses in order to smooth their students’ entrance to vocational programs at
higher education institutions.
These results also suggest that perhaps there are other labor market out-
comes such as wages and employment that will be relevant to evaluate the full
impact of this program.
Finally, it bears keeping in mind that the 2008 data on college enrollment
seems to be incomplete given the striking difference in enrollment relative to
2007. Thus, some of the results presented here —particularly the ones using 2008
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Tab. 3.2.Descriptive Statistics for Higher Education Outcomes
2007 2008
Full Sample UPZ Sample Full Sample UPZ Sample
TPS CEC TPS CEC TPS CEC TPS CEC
Enrollment and Majors
Enrolled at Selective 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.36
Enrolled at Selective and Public 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.27
Two-year Technology Program 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14
Two-year Vocational Program 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.23
Health 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Social Sciences 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Economics / Business 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16
Engineering / Architecture 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16
Education 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
Student Loan and Selective Program Eligibility
ICETEX Eligible for 5-year Program 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.83
ICETEX Eligible for 2-year Program 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
UD Eligible for Cadastral Engineering 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.18
UD Eligible for Mechanical Engineering 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06
UD Eligible for Industrial Engineering 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06
UD Eligible for Industrial Technology 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Dropout Behavior
Drop out in 1st Semester 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.26
Drop out in 1st or 2nd Semester 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.40
Observations 11759 518 2196 465 6006 296 1614 229











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tab. 3.4.OLS, Reduced Form, and 2SLS Estimates of CEC attendance
2007 2007-2008
Dependent Variable Mean OLS RF 2SLS Mean OLS RF 2SLS
ICFES Test Scores
Math Score in sd -0.071 0.114*** 0.021 0.092 -0.051 0.125*** 0.054*** 0.257***
(0.040) (0.021) (0.090) (0.026) (0.015) (0.084)
Verbal Score in sd -0.106 0.137*** 0.037 0.159 -0.078 0.145*** 0.036* 0.158
(0.035) (0.027) (0.105) (0.026) (0.019) (0.102)
Composite Score in sd -0.472 0.125*** 0.031* 0.133** -0.422 0.120*** 0.041*** 0.172***
(0.026) (0.016) (0.059) (0.019) (0.012) (0.063)
Higher Education Outcomes
Enrolled in College 0.228 0.092*** 0.028* 0.120** 0.187 0.057*** 0.006 0.046
(0.017) (0.015) (0.057) (0.012) (0.010) (0.048)
Enrolled at Selective and Public 0.034 0.013*** 0.003 0.011 0.031 0.011*** 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.017)
Two-year Vocational Program 0.097 0.044*** 0.020* 0.088** 0.076 0.022*** 0.011* 0.065**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.041) (0.007) (0.006) (0.030)
Drop out in 1st or 2nd Semester 0.088 0.047*** 0.010 0.044 0.078 0.024*** -0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.012) (0.046) (0.009) (0.006) (0.033)
UPZ Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogenous Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9815 9815 9815 21006 21006 21006
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Notes: This figure presents kernel distributions of all ICFES test takers in the second semester of 2008 in Bogota.
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